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INTRODUCTION 
Instability within a developing region is detri¬ 
mental both to the region and to interests external to the 
region which are dependent on production within the region 
or have commitments to nations or factions within the region. 
The Middle East is a developing region: first, in that 
there is an expressed desire to acquire and develop modern 
technology and industry; and second, in that oil wealth 
makes development possible. The Arab-Israeli conflict is 
not the only source of instability within the region. 
Economic, ideological, national, and traditional differences 
among the Arab nations are sources of potential conflict. 
The instability of the Middle East causes resources to be 
spent on non-productive military purchases and inhibits 
cooperation between nations. Furthermore, conflict within 
the Middle East could engage superpowers in direct confron¬ 
tation. Instability in this crucial area must be diminished. 
While diplomacy, negotiation, and coercion can all 
be used to reduce tensions between nations, one viewpoint 
states that the cause of conflict is unanswered human need. 
This viewpoint sees efforts to better humanity as the best 
response to tensions between people. This study adopts this 
humanistic viewpoint and applies it to the needs of the 
1 
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Middle East. The method used to address these needs is 
prescription. 
Prescriptions are made freely by many people. 
Prescription in the social sciences must be distinguished 
from expressed opinion and unsupported advice. To make this 
distinction a rigorous effort to define a methodology of 
prescription has been undertaken. Though tedious and 
perhaps too rigorous to be completely adhered to, this 
methodology serves as the basis for the prescriptions derived 
in Chapter Five, and can hopefully be used for further 
prescriptions as the context of the Middle East evolves. 
The analysis of the Middle Eastern context made in 
this study focuses on the Arab nations, and, indeed, the 
Arab nations as a region. The Arab region is simply defined 
as those nations which speak Arabic as a national tongue. 
Israel is not ignored in the entire process of regional 
development, but is excluded from direct participation in 
the early stages of cooperation to minimize the input of 
political factors into a process designed to avoid political 
confrontation. 
The obstacles to cooperation and development within 
the Arab region are acknowledged by the process of pre¬ 
scription as either subjects for action or factors to be 
taken into consideration. Obstacles which were judged to be 
currently insurmountable are not ignored but approached 
indirectly. 
The survey and collation of integration theory was 
3 
undertaken with a single objective in mind: A Prescriptive 
Theory for Regional Integrative Development. There exists 
within the discipline of international integration theory 
sufficient analysis, history, and criticism of the various 
approaches to integration theory. This study amplifies only 
those parts of existing theory which contribute to the 
desired collation. 
Nothing more than a beginning step has been taken. 
Hopefully, this collation of other people's thoughts will 
stimulate further analysis and discussion which may 
eventually lead to the refinements necessary to a blueprint 
for action. The Prescriptive Theory for Regional Integra¬ 
tive Development establishes some guidelines by which such 
a blueprint may be drawn. 
CHAPTER I 
THE METHODOLOGY OF PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY 
Values 
The purpose of this study is to develop a set of 
prescriptions for the Arab Region. Since the study of 
politics strives to be a science, an effort will be made to 
follow a scientific method. The derivation of prescriptions 
must follow the development of a theory if one is to adhere 
to scientific methodology. However, political science 
cannot pretend to be a "hard science" held fast by invariable 
cause and effect and devoid of any social bias. Thus, the 
development of a theory which will yield prescriptions for 
a particular region involves from its beginning an awareness 
and consideration of the context within which it is to be 
applied. The theory becomes a "prescriptive theory" which 
transmits certain values which are held true. Gunnar Myrdal 
acknowledges the presence of "value premises" in the social 
sciences. The following quotation from Myrdal is a caveat 
of great importance to the social scientist. 
There is no way of studying social reality other 
than from the viewpoint of human ideals. A "disinterested 
social science" has never existed, and for logical rea¬ 
sons, cannot exist. The value connotation of our main 
concepts represents our interest in a matter, gives 
direction to our thoughts and significance to our 
inferences. It poses the questions without which there 
are no answers. 
The recognition that our very concepts are value- 
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loaded implies that they cannot be defined except in 
terms of political valuations.4 It is, indeed, on 
account of scientific stringency that these valuations 
be made explicit. They represent the value premises for 
scientific analysis; contrary to widely held opinions, 
not only the practical conclusions from a scientific 
analysis, but the analysis itself depends necessarily on 
value premises. 
A value premise should not be chosen arbitrarily— 
it must be relevant and significant in relation to the 
society in which we live. It can, therefore, only be 
ascertained by an examination of what people actually 
desire. People's desires are to some extent founded on 
erroneous beliefs about facts and causal relations. To 
that extent a corrected value premise—corresponding to 
what people would desire if their knowledge about the 
world around them were more perfect—can be construed 
and has relevance.1 
Myrdal speaks of a "corrected value premise" which 
is what people would actually desire if their "knowledge of 
the world around them were more perfect." Myrdal is imply¬ 
ing there exists an intrinsic value that becomes more 
evident as knowledge of the world becomes more perfect. 
Value premises, Myrdal says, must not be surmised arbitrarily 
But by what criterion can a value premise be chosen? How is 
intrinsic value defined? Is intrinsic value defined in 
terms of need, common good, metaphysical principle, politi¬ 
cal philosophy, or ideology? 
If one is to derive prescriptions for a region, what 
values will those prescriptions serve? Can we assume that 
peace, for example, is a common goal for all mankind? 
Obviously J. S. Nye thinks peace is not such a goal. 
International peace is not an absolute value. As 
Immanuel Kant pointed out two centuries ago, those who 
want eternal peace can find it in the graveyard. Many 
Pan-Africanists and Arab nationalists would place peace 
second to racial dignity or their view of historic 
6 
justice, and thus argue that the Organization of African 
Unity and the Arab League should be used accordingly.2 
Peace, as a value, is often contingent upon others 
values, such as honor, dignity, or justice. Peace is of 
value if certain conditions are met. In the Vietnam War the 
Nixon administration called for peace with honor. This 
meant that peace was of value only if the United States was 
able to maintain some degree of credibility with its allies 
and some degree of self esteem with itself. The concept of 
peace at any price was unacceptable to American policy makers. 
Peace, in itself, was not an absolute value. 
Arab leaders often link peace with justices Nye's 
quote above states many Arab nationalists would place peace 
second to historic justice as a value. Historic justice may 
be interpreted to mean the return of all lands occupied by 
Israel after the 1967 war and a guarantee of the rights and 
a homeland for the Palestinian people. Nye attributes the 
subordination of peace to "historic justice" to "Arab 
nationalists." If Nye meant by this "nationalists" who 
happen to be Arabs, he would probably be more accurate than 
if he meant Pan-Arab nationalists exclusively. Certainly, 
the subordination of peace to justice is true of many 
Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian, and Palestinian nationalists 
as well as those Arabs who promote Pan-Arab nationalism. A 
vital issue is whether Pan-Arab nationalism subordinates 
peace more or less than the secular nationalisms of Egypt, 
Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinian people. Clearly, this 
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issue can only be resolved by an understanding and definition 
of the hierarchy of values within each of the respective 
nationalisms. At the heart of the issue of the relative 
subordination of peace by Pan-Arab nationalism is the very 
nature of Pan-Arab nationalism itself. 
Charles Pentland relates peace to integration by 
separating the idea of integration from the idea of alliance. 
Pentland characterizes peace as a cousin of integration."^ 
The relationship between peace and integration is much closer 
than that of cousin to cousin. Integration theory must be 
established upon an unsubordinated value premise of peace to 
be clearly distinguished from the concept of alliance. 
From this point forward, Pan-Arabism will be distin¬ 
guished from Pan-Arab nationalism. By definition, Pan- 
Arabism will refer to those efforts directed at Arab inte¬ 
gration which establish peace as an unsubordinated value 
premise. Pan-Arab nationalism will not, by definition, 
leave peace unsubordinated. This definition of Pan-Arabism 
does not mean peace is of absolute value. Peace and inte¬ 
gration are related to the pursuit of justice through the 
means of cooperation and development. Peace is the keystone 
which links integration on one hand with development on the 
other. 
Having distinguished Pan-Arabism from Pan-Arab 
nationalism according to the subordination of peace, and the 
distinction between integration and alliance, the establish¬ 
ment of integration as a value premise for Pan-Arabism 
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becomes identitive. If Pan-Arabism does not depend upon 
alliance for its unity, it must depend upon integration. 
As Myrdal has said, "A value premise must not be 
chosen arbitrarily. ..." If a prescription is to be 
derived from a "prescriptive theory" for a particular region, 
that prescriptive theory must take into consideration the 
desires of those people within that specific region. If 
peace is subordinated to a desire for justice and the 
frustration of that desire manifests itself as hostility and 
a threat to peace, then a corrected value premise which 
leaves peace unsubordinated must, nevertheless, deal with 
the frustrations that subordinated peace in the first place. 
The value of peace must be supported by other values and 
other means that will diminish the frustrations and hostili¬ 
ties within the region. Values which are consonant with the 
value of peace and yet are capable of addressing the desire 
for justice must be instilled in a population that would 
otherwise seek war as a means of obtaining justice. Pan- 
Arabism, identified as the desire for peaceful integration 
within the Arab region, is just such a value. 
And yet peaceful integration might take many forms. 
J. S. Nye has defined three types of integration: economic, 
social, and political.^ Each of the types of integration is 
broken down into sub-categories. The sub-categories are 
associated with kinds of evidence by which the type of 
integration might be measured. The kinds of evidence pro¬ 
vide a means of determining the type of integration that 
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might be most consonant and supportive of an unsubordinated 
value premise of peace. The sub-category of economic inte¬ 
gration which Nye calls "Services" is evidenced by the 
expenditure of money on joint services within a region.^ 
The development of joint services within the Arab region is, 
at least on the surface, a benign activity. The development 
and extension of infrastructure projects could decrease 
economic hardship and lessen the plight of the Palestinians. 
Though economic development might increase the logistical 
capacity of Arabs to make war, it should decrease the incen¬ 
tive. Thus, the second supportive value premise of a 
prescriptive theory for the Arab region is the value of 
development. 
The value of development is widely debated. William 
Ophuls is perhaps the most eloquent of the many writers who 
question the desirability of development. Ophuls states, 
Nothing of real value would be lost if development 
were to cease. Rather, the likelihood of men and women 
leading reasonably happy, sane, fulfilled, and harmonious 
personal lives would be enhanced. Moreover, once the 
ultimately fruitless and self-destructive quest for 
evermore private affluence was abandoned, public amenity 
would be free to grow and to produce all kinds of 
cultural riches men have been able to enjoy in the past, 
even if the gross quantity of production were less than 
it is today.' 
Ophuls values culture over affluence. He sees 
affluence challenged by the growing scarcity of natural 
resources and the environmental impact of exponential growth. 
But again, the question of value cannot be discussed outside 
of the particular context of those specific people who might 
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hold that value. Though Lucian Pye has warned, "More 
fundamentally, it is a tragedy of the transitional society 
that the processes of change create profound insecurities in 
its people," it is unlikely the Arab region will abandon 
development because of the potential for insecurity.^ Sir 
Hamilton A. R. Gibb noted a "wave of antipathy" in the Arab 
world against Western values.^ G. E. von Grunebaum observed 
"Secular enlightenment does not easily replace sacred reve¬ 
lation ."Indeed, a reactionary element has existed and 
continues to exist in the Arab region. The reforms of 
Kaddafi in Libya and Wahabi elements in Saudi Arabia, are 
examples of traditionalism, but it is easy to over-romanti¬ 
cize about the values of tradition. From the farmer in the 
Sudan who longs for a tractor and irrigation to the business¬ 
man in Beirut who wants replacement parts for his Mercedes 
Benz, the temptations of development and a modernized 
society are very tangible. 
F. Lamond Tullis questions the power of tradition in 
the face of modernization. He states, 
A pervasive value of economic growth exists in 
nearly all the countries of the world. People want to 
be not only modern but ultramodern if they can. Of 
course, in terms of the new economic symbols, many 
countries have not achieved even a minimal state of 
modernity. Indeed, actually, several have scarcely 
incorporated the old symbols of rationality and 
secularism. But no country seems to be immune from the 
desire to develop economically.H 
Tullis1 argument is not peculiar to himself or 
inapplicable to the Arab region. Indeed, Daniel Lerner in 
his chapter "Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization" 
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supports Tullis. 
But the societies-in-a-hurry have little patience 
with the historical pace of Western development; what 
happened in the West over centuries, some Middle 
Easterners now seek to accomplish in years. Moreover 
they seek to do it in their own way.12 
Lerner not only sees modernization as a widely held 
value in the Middle East, he sees modernization as a unify¬ 
ing principle. 
The disorder and poverty in the Middle East . . . 
seem incapable of being remedied except by a greater 
solidarity among Islamic countries and by a general 
modernization in the countries. But though modernization 
is a tangible fact, only the pace of which might require 
control and acceleration, Muslim solidarity is only a 
fleeting, variable, uncertain supposition. . . . 
Modernization, then, is the unifying principle in this 
study of the varied Middle East.13 
Modernization and development are aspirations found 
in the Middle East. To build prescriptions on a value system 
which incorporates peace, and development as cornerstones 
does not stray from the sentiments of the Arab people. 
Development is consonant with the desire for peace and with 
the process of economic integration. The major task of this 
thesis will be the linkage of peace, integration, and 
development into a prescriptive theory for the Arab region. 
The Economic Commission for Western Asia has written that, 
"The ultimate satisfaction of needs, material or otherwise . . 
depends, in the final analysis on progress achieved in 
producing goods and services."^ If development is seen as 
a means for the "ultimate satisfaction of needs, material or 
otherwise ..." then the linkage of development defined as 
such with peace and integration will not ignore the cultural 
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and identitive values of the Arab people nor will it ignore 
the abiding desire for the provision of justice to the 
Palestinian people. Peace through integration and develop¬ 
ment will provide a means for attaining justice. Upon this 
hope the following theory will be developed. 
Having acknowledged the value premises for a 
prescriptive theory for Regional Integrative Development, 
the derivation, validation, and methodology of prescriptive 
theory can follow. 
Prescriptive Theory 
The definition of a prescriptive theory requires an 
understanding of the role of the social scientist in the 
process of theory building. A prescriptive theory cannot be 
defined until theory, itself, is defined. Gustav Bergman, 
the Swedish philosopher, has stated, 
A theory is a group of laws, usually rather few, from 
which others, usually a larger number, have actually 
been deduced and from which one expects to deduce still 
further ones. The laws that serve as the premises of the 
deductions are called the axioms of the theory, those 
that appear as conclusions are called its theorems.15 
The definition of a prescriptive theory is made up 
of two parts. The first part is the general definition of 
theory; the second part is the modification of the general 
definition of theory brought about by the acceptance of the 
limitations of the social scientist in creating a theory 
that fits the abstract definition of theory. The modifica¬ 
tion of the general definition of theory is more of an 
addition than an amendment. Prescriptive theory differs from 
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simple prescription because of a definitional integration 
that allows the basic definition of theory to remain intact. 
The juxtaposition of prescription and theory requires a 
precise schematic of the foundation which is the definition 
of theory. The process of deduction, or the analytical 
reasoning from the general to the particular, is the 
operation that takes place within the structure of a theory. 
Hempel's visualization of the structure of a theory is 
illustrative. 
A scientific theory might therefore be likened to a 
complex spatial network: Its terms are represented by 
the knots while threads connecting the latter correspond, 
in part, to the definitions and, in part to the funda¬ 
mental and derivative hypotheses contained in the theory. 
The whole system floats, as it were, above the plane of 
observation and is anchored by its rules of interpreta¬ 
tion. 16 
But what is the purpose of a theory? What is the 
purpose of the process of deduction? May Brobeck offers, 
A theory is such a deductively connected set of laws. 
It has the logical form of an explanation. Some explan¬ 
ations (those that explain statements of individual 
facts) contain both laws and statements of individual 
facts as premises. In a theory all the statements, both 
explained and explaining, are generalizations.!^ 
Brobeck's description proposes that a theory's pur¬ 
pose is explanation. Certainly in the physical sciences 
explanation is a primary purpose of theory. The theories of 
Galileo, Newton, and Einstein all explain the behavior of 
physical reality. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff observe. 
Application of this scientific method during the last 
250 years has produced some very impressive results in 
the "hard sciences"--particularly in the form of univer¬ 
sal uniformities or generalized laws. In physics, 
astrophysics, chemistry, biology and certain areas of 
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psychology a high degree of predictability has been 
achieved. But even the "exact" sciences with all their 
powerful methodologies, reach limits to what can be 
known at any given minute. According to Werner 
Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy, for example, 
it is not possible to determine simultaneously both the 
position and the movement of a particle of matter.18 
Explanation and prediction are two purposes included 
in a general definition of theory. However, even in the 
"hard sciences" predictability is undermined by Heisenberg's 
principle of indeterminacy which states that the process of 
observation itself becomes a factor in the outcome of any 
determination. Heisenberg's principle applies to inanimate 
sub-atomic particles. The observations of social scientists 
also contain this potential for affecting outcomes. 
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff further noted. 
As we pointed out earlier, scientists are dubious of 
a capability to explain unaccompanied by a corresponding 
capability to predict. Most social scientists readily 
concur with the historian's judgment that unique human 
events and choices lie beyond predictability. We cannot 
assign a precise probability to a "discrete event."19 
To explain or predict a scientist must first observe. 
Given that these observations may interfere with the outcome 
of a study. Max Weber adds another restriction to the pro¬ 
cess of observation. 
Now, as soon as we attempt to reflect about the way 
in which life confronts us in immediate concrete situa¬ 
tions, it presents us with a multiplicity of successively 
and coexistently emerging and disappearing events, both 
"within" and "outside" ourselves. The absolute infini¬ 
tude of this multiplicity is seen to remain undiminished 
even when our attention is focused on a single "object," 
for instance, a concrete act of exchange as soon as we 
seriously attempt an exhaustive description of all the 
individual components of this "individual phenomena," 
to say nothing of explaining it causally. All the 
15 
analysis of infinite reality which the finite human mind 
can conduct rests on the tacit assumption that only a 
finite portion of this reality constitutes the "object" 
of scientific investigation, and that it is only 
"important" in the sense of "worthy of being known."20 
Theory has a structure that can be defined in terms 
of its deductive processes; however, the structural defini¬ 
tion of theory is insufficient to bridge the gap between 
the logical and abstract aspect of pure theory and the prag¬ 
matic and prescriptive aspect of social theory. Hans 
Morgenthau, in his magnum opus Politics Among Nations, writes 
about the necessity of the adhesion of theoretical con¬ 
sistency to empirical reality. 
The test by which such a theory must be judged is 
not a priori and abstract but empirical and pragmatic. 
The theory, in other words, must be judged not by some 
preconceived abstract principle or concept unrelated to 
reality, but by its purpose: to bring order and meaning 
to a mass of phenomena which without it would remain 
disconnected and unintelligible. It must meet a dual 
test, an empirical and a logical one: Do the facts, as 
they actually are, lend themselves to the interpretation 
the theory has put upon them and do the conclusions at 
which the theory arrives follow with logical necessity 
from its premises? In short, is the theory consistent 
with the facts and within itself?21 
A general definition of theory requires the power of 
explanation and prediction. These powers ultimately depend 
upon the capability of a scientist to observe events in such 
a way that these observations may be interpreted by the 
theory. It has been postulated that: One, prediction, and 
therefore explanation are not readily available to the social 
scientist, and; two, the process of selecting "the object of 
scientific investigation" involves a value judgment as to 
what is "worthy of being known." As stated earlier, the 
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observations of social scientists contain a potential for 
affecting the outcome of the situation they are studying. 
Rather than being disheartened by the embarrassing role of 
clumsy interloper, the social scientist can acknowledge his 
presence and the responsibility that presence entails. 
Having entered into the equation of human behavior, the 
scientist can realize the prescriptive capacity of theoriz¬ 
ing. To ascribe prescription to theory is nothing more than 
to recognize a potential inherent in the observation 
necessary to the formulation of theory. 
Theory and Policy 
Myrdal has noted that, "It might be useful to recall 
at the start that the social sciences have all received their 
impetus much more from the urge to improve society than from 
simple curiosity about its workings."22 
In describing the properties of methods for policy 
analysis, James S. Coleman has stated that, "It is important 
at the very outset to sharply distinguish a methodology that 
has as its philosophical base the testing of theories from a 
methodology that has as its philosophic base a guide to 
action."23 
It is because a methodology of testing theories 
cannot be isolated from a methodology of policy prescription 
that Coleman's distinction must be contradicted. What is 
needed is a bridge between social theory with its component 
value premises and social policy which requires a basis from 
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which it can be derived. The idea that policy can be dis¬ 
tinguished from theory is only the admission that much policy 
is based on undeveloped or unidentified theoretical proposi¬ 
tions . 
In his description, Kenneth Hoover proposes that, 
The most conventional posture for a social scientist 
is one of pragmatism: a theory is only as good as its 
present and potential uses in the service of human needs. 
It is tempting, but misleading, to conceive of theory 
as something rocklike and immobile behind the whizz and 
blur of daily experience. Rather, theory is a sometimes 
ingenious creation of human beings in their quest for 
need fulfillment. People create theories in proportion 
to their needs and the theories they create can be either 
functional or disfunctional to those needs.24 
Hoover contends that theories occur in proportion to 
the needs of humanity, and that the usefulness of theory can 
be determined in relation to those human needs. There can 
be no clear dichotomy between a theory or a policy, both 
which are responsive to human needs. The absence of this 
dichotomy probably inspired Coleman's search for a clear 
distinction. Charles Pentland identifies a group of scholars 
that, in accordance with Coleman's wishes, separates theory 
into a particular category, that of "scientific theory;" and 
in the same paragraph notes that "students of integration 
theory" seem to avoid the question of the validity of such a 
distinction. 
The theory to which these communities of scholars 
aspire is usually seen as some kind of logically inter¬ 
related set of general statements capable of empirical 
testing. It provides description explanations and often 
predictions about the empirical world, with reference to 
which it is commonly being reformulated. Whether such 
"scientific" theory can or ought to be the sole aspira¬ 
tion and preoccupation of political scientists has been 
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and remains, a contentious issue. Most students of inte¬ 
gration quite willingly leave the debate over a "general 
theory" of politics to others, and simply assume that it 
is both necessary and possible to develop islands of 
"middle range" theory in such areas as theirs.25 
By accepting the notion of a "middle range" theory 
those students postulate the existence of a bridge between 
theory and policy. Pentland goes on to say, 
Few integration theorists, however, would accept that 
explanation is the sole or sufficient purpose of theory. 
Indeed, normative positions are rarely, if at all, dis¬ 
guised in their writings. Integration itself is assumed 
to be a good thing--a proposition which is understandable 
if not exactly self evident. From such general proposi¬ 
tions and assumptions, numerous prescription flow, 
although theorists differ considerably as to the emphasis 
they place on policy advice. In functionalist writings 
the advocacy of solutions for specific social and politi¬ 
cal problems is usually the main object of argument, but 
it does not follow that necessarily an explanatory theory 
cannot be found as well. Conversely, the most self¬ 
consciously "scientific approaches," such as those of 
Haas and Deutsch, do not preclude (and often in fact 
encourage) the derivation of policy advice by those 
engaged in the politics of integration. In short, the 
normative foundations and prescriptive uses of theory 
are a part of the total fabric of an approach, and to 
examine them closely may aid in an understanding of its 
explanatory components.26 
Before attempting a rigorous definition of 
prescriptive theory, some discussion of the typology of 
theories beyond the simple dichotomy of "scientific" or 
"pure" theory and prescriptive theory is in order. One 
typology suggested by Conway and Feigert classifies theories 
as to the perspective from which they are applied and the 
terrain which they cover. 
Three different interpretations can be made of what 
it is a theory represents, these three being labelled as 
descriptive, instrumental, and realist. According to 
the realist view, a theory is either true or false. Thus, 
one evaluates a theory in terms of success of efforts to 
falsify it, or more accurately to falsify deductions from 
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the theory. . . . The second view of theory is that a 
theory is not and cannot be considered in terms of its 
accuracy in describing reality. The instrumentalist 
interpretation views a theory as a means of organizing 
one's perceptions of reality. As such it provides rules 
for organizing one's perception of reality. Thus, it 
can be evaluated in terms of its usefulness in doing 
that. The third interpretation views theory as 
descriptive, that is theories are not true or false, but 
describe in a simplified fashion, aspects of reality. 
A concomitant aspect of this descriptive view is that 
theories do not explain.27 ^  
The three views of theory put forth above address 
themselves to different intellectual needs and are evaluated 
by different means; however, all three are abstracted from 
direct involvement in the terrain to which they are applied. 
The social sciences study human behavior; and, if human 
behavior is described without explanation, then descriptive 
theory is little more than narrative. The organization of 
perceptions of reality which takes place in the instrumen¬ 
talist view of theory can be evaluated, but only to the degree 
that organization effects human response to human behavior, 
not to the degree that theory promotes an organization of 
perception in itself regardless of the consequences of such 
organization. If theory is evaluated by its ability to 
organize perception, the question of whether or not the 
organization promotes well being is ignored. The remaining 
view, realist theory, purports to be scientific, depending 
on the method of falsification. By the method of falsifica¬ 
tion, if a theory or its deductions are falsified, or 
contrary to observation then the theory is invalidated. But 
is it not conceivable that a theory could be manifestly 
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contrary to fact or present conditions and still have social 
utility? If a theory sets forth a group of interrelated 
propositions that have no present empirical truth or validity, 
but in their construction contain a self-fulfilling potential 
for the modification of present reality in accordance with 
those propositions, does not that theory contain the poten¬ 
tial for social utility, regardless of its present state? 
Within their typology of theory, Dougherty and 
Pfaltzgraff include, 
A type of theory . . . defined as a set of proposals 
of action for the statesmen. Such prescriptions are 
usually: (a) assumptions about the international system 
such as the existence of a balance of power (variously 
defined) in which political actors supposedly take one 
or another course of action to achieve a particular kind 
of goal; or (b) policy recommendations based upon the 
results of the study of one of several instances of a 
particular kind of political behavior.28 
Prescriptive theory is that type of theory that 
synthesizes the abstract principles of deduction and inter¬ 
nal consistency with the normative assumptions and the policy 
recommendations arrived at through the empirical process of 
scientific investigation.' Prescriptive theory is by defini¬ 
tion overarching. While it can be argued that prescriptive 
theory is a hybrid, it is a hybrid necessary to those social 
scientists who realize that if theory is to engage reality 
then it must pass every test of internal consistency before 
being applied to the laboratory of human hopes and human 
misery. To those who hold themselves accountable for what 
they do or fail to do and the consequence therein, 
prescriptive theory provides a guide to action that passes 
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both empirical and logical testing prior to policy implemen¬ 
tation. 
The methodology of prescriptive theorizing would 
involve the following steps: 
1. The identification of value premises held by the 
society under study 
2. The correction of those value premises to coin¬ 
cide with empirical reality 
3. The statement of propositions from which deduct¬ 
ions can be drawn 
4. The derivation of those deductions and their 
transformation into policy plans, prescriptions, programs 
and projects 
The above methodology is at best skeletal, but can 
serve as the framework for the development of specific 
prescriptive theories. In the formation of a prescriptive 
theory of Regional Integrative Development for the Arab 
region, the third step, "the statement of propositions from 
which deductions can be drawn," will involve a .comprehensive 
synthesis of many theories and sets of theories. Prior to 
this synthetic process an introduction to the context and 
the outline of the synthesis is necessary. Following the 
final introductory section, the synthesis of a prescriptive 
theory of Regional Integrative Development (RID) will begin. 
Setting 
In the second half of the twentieth century mankind 
has lived with the horrible possibility of nuclear holocaust. 
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This horrible potential of war, ironically, has become an 
imperative for peace. Not only must direct nuclear power 
confrontation be avoided, but situations capable of trapping 
nuclear powers into inescapable confrontation must be modi¬ 
fied. The Arab-Israeli conflict, a constant state of 
belligerency, spanning thirty years punctuated by four wars 
is just such a situation capable of spawning the unthinkable. 
A state of non-belligerency in the Middle East would not only 
benefit Arabs and Israelis, but would also defuse the explo¬ 
sive potential of US-Soviet confrontation. War in the Middle 
East has as recently as 19 73 brought US nuclear forces to a 
global alert. 
However illogical nuclear confrontation may be, in 
the heat of conflict where client states are battling for 
survival and regional hegemony and global prestige are at 
stake, illogical decisions can be made. The global alert of 
1973 in itself is sufficient warning to the world to warrant 
an international interest in a lasting peace. Numerous 
prescriptions, projections and proposals for peace in the 
Middle East have been ventured. Negotiation, mediation, and 
enforced settlement are all methods by which peace might be 
obtained. Much has been written about shuttle diplomacy, 
comprehensive peace plans, and Geneva conferences. The 
eminent statesman, George W. Ball, has written. 
Thus the time is ripe for the United States to take 
a strong hand to save Israel from herself and in the 
process try to prevent a tragic war that could endanger 
the economies of the major non-Communist powers, separate 
the United States from its allies and precipitate an 
enormous internal debate, and pose a serious danger of a 
clash with the Soviet Union.30 
23 
Ball's suggestion for an imposed settlement is one 
of many approaches that might be taken to reduce military 
and political antagonism; however, his description of the 
consequences of "a tragic war" is widely accepted. Whatever 
approach is taken to instigate peace in the Middle East, one 
caveat must be heeded: If a concerted effort to bring about 
peace fails, the likelihood of war will probably increase. 
The great effort of Anwar Sadat, however inspirational, con¬ 
tains an element of risk. If peace initiatives, negotia¬ 
tions, or imposed settlements are not founded on the willing¬ 
ness of all parties in the region to accept the resultant 
equilibrium, the challenges persuant to that equilibrium will 
be destabilizing. Though it is possible that a diplomatic 
settlement is attainable and would have lasting value, to 
limit the peace effort in the Middle East to such a settle¬ 
ment plays a dangerous game of probabilities. Beyond a 
diplomatic solution, a social, economic, and technical pro¬ 
gram to promote regional development and cooperation would 
increase the incentives and probability for a lasting peace 
in the Middle East. 
A regional program of development and cooperation 
must balance many variables. It is useful to categorize 
these variables into three groups: theoretical; political; 
and empirical. Theoretical variables are the components of 
the prescriptive theory from which the regional program is 
drawn. Political variables may be seen as the motivations 
of and the restraints upon political actors in the region. 
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Empirical variables are not in themselves political and tend 
to be quantifiable, but nevertheless determine political 
realities. 
Obviously, theory, politics and empirical data are 
epistemologically interrelated and have definite overlap. 
However, the differentiation of the three categories of • 
variables allows for the isolation of political factors from 
the effects of theoretical prescriptions on empirical reality. 
The reason for this differentiation is to downplay intracta¬ 
ble political differences and actively modify empirical 
reality through theoretical prescription. It is not so much 
that these theoretical prescriptions should ignore political 
variables as they should avoid injecting political or 
factional considerations into a program that should be 
regional in scope and homogeneous in character. 
The relationship between theoretical and empirical 
variables constitutes a continuous loop with an interchange- 
ability of cause and effect. The political variables con¬ 
stitute an area contained by the theoretical and empirical 
loop. The three sets of variables constitute a system but 
the set of political variables does not directly interact 
with the loop. Political variables define an area around 
which the interactive loop must be drawn. The prescriptive 
theory requires the definition of all three sets of variables. 
The identification of those theoretical, empirical, 
and political variables necessary to the formation of a 
theoretical prescription must take into consideration the 
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ultimate objectives of such a prescription: peace and 
development. The objective of peace has been modified to 
mean that peace which derives from regional cooperation 
rather than peace which is imposed upon an unwilling populace, 
either by external pressure, internal repression, or the 
utter exhaustion that would follow a future Middle Eastern 
war. The objective of development must be defined in the 
context of the optimal use of all resources. Further defini¬ 
tion of peace and development must limit these objectives to 
a scope appropriate to the corresponding levels of coopera¬ 
tion achieved vis-a-vis the Arabs and the Israelis. 
A regional cooperative program may be defined as 
Arab-Israeli cooperation or inter-Arab cooperation. Arab- 
Israeli cooperation could be implicit or explicit. Explicit 
Arab-Israeli cooperation is not acceptable to all Arabs, but 
implicit cooperation is desirable if tensions in the region 
are to be reduced. Implicit Arab-Israeli cooperation could 
take the form of simultaneous or reciprocal, yet ostensibly 
unilateral efforts at disarmament and promotion of attitudes 
of friendship between hostile peoples, on one hand, and an 
increase in diplomatic and technical cooperation in inter¬ 
national organizations on the other. A multi-phased program 
of diminishing hostilities could be the prelude to an 
explicit program of Arab-Israeli cooperation. 
While the prospect of increased inter-Arab cooperation 
might intimidate Israel with the possibility of a unified 
Arab military force, a program of cooperation that emphasized 
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the creation of a stabilizing network of investment, trade, 
and development projects would increase the incentives for 
peace for all Arab nations. 
Eventual Arab-Israeli cooperation could be a conse¬ 
quence of Arab investment in development projects within the 
Arab region. Such investments could create an infra¬ 
structure that would be perceived to be of sufficient value 
to discourage war. The conservation of peace in the Middle 
East thus becomes a function of the development of incentives 
for peace through two tiers of cooperation: inter-Arab, the 
first tier, and Arab-Israeli, the second. 
The development of peace incentives may be tacitly 
approached as a by-product of regional economic integration; 
thereby diminishing resistance to peace by placing the widely 
accepted value premise of regional development as the impli¬ 
cit vanguard of the peace initiative. In this way, that 
segment of the Arab world that could not work for peace 
directly, could have that powerful emotion, national pride, 
sublimated into a pan-Arabist goal of regional development. 
Clearly, it is well worth the time to try to define a system 
of development and integration that would promote an end to 
hostilities in the Middle East. This thesis is an attempt 
to define just such a system which will be called a system 
for Regional Integrative Development. 
Regional Integrativo DevGlopment: 
A Prelude 
The definitions of regional integration and 
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development are a necessary prelude to a specific analysis 
of the Middle Eastern context capable of determining the 
strategy, scope and specifics of Regional Integrative 
Development. The wealth of articles, anthologies, and 
treatises devoted to the concentric circles of theory, 
hypothesis, and empirical generalizations that surround the 
adolescent discipline of regional integration provide the 
resources necessary to the task of a relevant definition of 
Regional Integrative Development. The completion of the 
definition of Regional Integrative Development must utilize 
research and theory in the field of regional development. 
The ready synthesis of the related fields of regional inte¬ 
gration and regional development will then serve as the 
prescriptive network that can be superimposed on the empiri¬ 
cal field of the Arab region. From this superimposition of 
derivative and synthetic theory upon empirical data, specific 
prescriptions can be elicited. 
Regional integration theory may be, itself, derived 
from world order theory, functionalism, and what may be 
debatedly called the Idealist perspective of International 
Relations theory. The synthesis of Regional Integration 
theory and Regional Development theory gives a form to 
Regional Integrative Development theory which may be 
visualized as two vertically congruent structures which 
converge at a juncture of increasing specificity. By virtue 
of its antecedent specificity. Regional Integrative 
Development theory is capable of empirical validation and 
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endowed with prescriptive potential. 
The convergence of Regional Integration and Regional 
Development theory is an admittedly prescribed juxtaposition, 
which in itself is laden with both empirical analysis and 
value premises identified in the previous discussion of value. 
Nevertheless, Regional Integrative Development theory is 
perfectly capable of being judged according to Professor 
Morgenthau's previously quoted criteria: internal consist¬ 
ency and external validation. 
In that Regional Integrative Development theory (RID) 
is derived from the antecedent theories of integration and 
development, a certain level of empirical validation is 
already inherited. The more germane methodology of empirical 
validation of prescriptive theory first evaluates the outcome 
of prescriptive policies derived from the theory and secondly 
analyzes the entire setting in search of interceding varia¬ 
bles that might have affected that outcome. 
The internal consistency of RID theory is dependent 
on the collation of the diverse components which constitute 
each of its antecedent theories. The diversity of Integration 
Theory and Development theory may be seen as having vertical 
and horizontal dimensions. 
Horizontal diversity derives from the many scholars 
who have contributed their own interpretations of integration 
and development. The collation of horizontal diversity 
involves the definition of the range of the diverse theoreti¬ 
cal interpretations of integration and development and the 
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redefinition of operational terms within these disparate 
interpretations and location of areas of consonance at 
similar points within the horizontal dimension and to choose 
among the dissonances those particular interpretations most 
consonant with the whole. 
Vertical diversity derives from the different levels 
of theoretical specificity, differentiated by the degree of 
the narrowing focus of attention. The collation of the 
vertical dimension involves the imposition of a consistency 
dependent upon an adherence to definitional precedence 
established at the highest level of abstraction inherent in 
the general theory. By establishing definitional precedence 
at the highest level of the vertical dimension, the process 
of complete theoretical collation then can spread downward 
incrementally exhausting the horizontal diversity of each 
vertical level before moving to a lower level of abstraction. 
To achieve the exhaustion of diversity, the process of 
collation must limit itself to a less than comprehensive 
domain of theory, but will, nevertheless, attempt to address 
the major areas of Integration and Development Theory. 
In concrete terms, a theory of Regional Integrative 
Development must derive its internal consistency from the 
logical arrangement of its component parts. Within each of 
the component theories collated in the horizontal dimension 
there exists a backlog of empirical or external validation. 
However, since the process of collation involves selective 
perception, the subsumed empirical validation of the components 
30 
is insufficient for the new, hybrid theory. This thesis 
will look to the Arab region itself for historical, sociolo¬ 
gical, and political validation for the Prescriptive Theory 
for Regional Integrative Development. 
The construction of a prescriptive framework for a 
working peace in the Middle East begins with a foundation of 
theory. The particular type of theory most suited for pro¬ 
viding a prescriptive framework has been defined. The 
creation of A Prescriptive Theory for Regional Integrative 
Development for the Arab region will involve the collation 
of existing integration and development theories, but to 
avoid a hodge-podge, an effort will be made to define the 
terminology used in the theory building process, and to limit 
the input to the "classic" integration theorists and those 
commentators who best interpret "classical" theory to 
language relevant to the study at hand. 
CHAPTER II 
THE DERIVATION OF DEFINITIONS 
Integration theory covers a wide range of disciplines. 
Economics, sociology, and political science all contribute to 
the multi-disciplinary study of integration. Even when the 
focus is narrowed to a single discipline, such as political 
science, integration theory cannot easily be pinned down. 
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff comment, "... political integra¬ 
tion cuts across the traditional fields into which political 
science is organized, and is as relevant to the student of 
politics at the local and metropolitan level as to the student 
of comparative and international politics.""'" Many approaches 
to the definition of integration must be accommodated in a 
composite theory. A collation of definitions is more of an 
umbrella under which different theories are placed than a 
true amalgamation in which various definitional components 
are rearranged into a new definition. From this umbrella of 
definitions several approaches to integration theory can be 
discussed with the eventual aim of weaving together some of 
the common threads in each of the approaches. It would be 
difficult to meld theories together with a definitional pre¬ 
cedence that, due to its amalgamation, precluded, in part, 
the substance of theories from which it was drawn. An early 
narrowing of a definition would impede the process of 
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building a composite theory of integration. A wide defini¬ 
tion of integration should accommodate many integration 
theorists, and their many approaches to integration. 
A narrowing focus on integration theory relevant to 
prescriptions appropriate to the Arab region will precede 
from divergent approaches to integration. The ultimate goal 
of this manipulation of theories is the Prescriptive Theory 
for Regional Integrative Development. As the focus narrows 
toward this goal, the process of collation will be dictated 
by the necessities of relevancy rather than the whimsies of 
semantic exercise. The end result must be applicable to a 
region, and must emphasize mutual development. These 
caveats, admittedly arbitrary, will be the tools for the 
construction of a prescriptive theory. Many controversies 
concerning regionalism, development, and the nature of inte¬ 
gration itself will not be resolved. Out of necessity, 
however, the Prescriptive Theory for Regional Integrative 
Development will adopt positions which are controversial and 
which have been widely debated in integration literature. 
Again, the side of the argument will be determined by the 
context to which the prescription is to be applied. In each 
case where a decision is made between conflicting definitions 
and approaches, an effort will be made to analyze the conse¬ 
quences of the alternative definitions and approaches. 
Definitions 
The definition of integration can vary from Galtung's 
rather simple "the process whereby two or more actors form a 
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new actor" to Karl Deutsch's somewhat refined. 
To integrate generally means to make a whole out of 
parts--this is, to turn previously separate units into 
components of a coherent system. The essential 
characteristic of any system . . . is a significant 
degree of interdependence between its components, and 
interdependence between any two components or units 
consists in the probability that a change in one of them-- 
or an operation performed on one of them--will produce a 
predictable change in the other. . . . 
. . . Integration, then, is a relationship among 
units in which they are mutually interdependent and 
jointly produce system properties which they would 
separately lack. Sometimes, however, the word "integra¬ 
tion" is also used to describe the integrative process by 
which such a relationship or state of affairs among 
separate units is attained.3 
Deutsch's refined definition raises a primary issue 
in the determination of what integration is. Is integration 
a process or a condition? This debate has been commented upon 
and joined by many. Ernst Haas notes that, "The root of the 
trouble is that scholars disagree about whether the term 
'integration1 refers to a process, a condition or both. To 
make matters worse, many writers vary the sense according to 
the context.Haas's reference is to an earlier definition 
of integration put forward by Deutsch which describes inte¬ 
gration as a condition in which people "have attained within 
a territory a sense of community and of institutions and 
practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for 
a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among 
its population."5 Haas argues that Deutsch's earlier 
definition begs the question. He notes. 
The leading exponent of the transactional approach to 
integration is Karl Deutsch. The flow of transactions 
in terms of volume--i.e., a process--constitutes one 
dimension of his analysis. But at the same time Deutsch 
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defines integration as a condition under which "integra¬ 
ted" states have forgone the use of violence as a means 
of settling their differences. Thus some of the indica¬ 
tors by which the final condition can be identified also 
serve as a definition of the process; ranges of trans¬ 
actions constitute integration. This manner of concep¬ 
tualizing the phenomenon makes it exceedingly difficult 
to isolate cause and effect.6 
Perhaps Deutsch's refined definition written in 1968 
was adjusted to Haas1 observation. Considerable interplay 
and cross reference exists in the realm of integration theory. 
Amitai Etzioni's note on page six of his book Political 
Unification demonstrates this interplay that existed in the 
formative period of integration theory. The note is offered 
here to introduce a discussion of Etzioni's concept of inte¬ 
gration as well as for it's clarity and definition of the 
positions of perhaps the three most important contributors to 
the field of political integration. 
We shall refer below to the state of the system, with 
respect to the properties discussed, as its "level of 
integration." It should be noted, though, that we are 
dealing with political integration, not with religious, 
economic, or general integration. Karl W. Deutsch, et 
al. use "integration" to refer to the relationship among 
countries that no longer anticipate engaging in war with 
one another (Political Community and the North Atlantic 
Area. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1957, p. 31). Canada and the United States, for instance, 
are "integrated." This is a different definition, one 
that has a lower threshold than ours. Ernst B. Haas 
uses "political integration" to refer to "the process 
whereby political actors in several distinct national 
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expecta¬ 
tions, and political activities toward a new center, 
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over 
the preexisting national states." (The Uniting of 
Europe. Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 1958, p. 16.) The threshold of this definition 
is higher than that of Deutsch, et al. but not as high 
as ours. (Cf. Haas' discussion of "political community" 
pp. 4-11.) In particular, it does not require the 
ability of the "institutions" to significantly affect 
the allocation of resources as does our definition. 
Note also that "Haas" uses "integration" to refer to a 
process while we use it to refer to a condition (Deutsch 
uses the concept to refer to both).7 
Etzioni mentions in his note above that his defini¬ 
tion of integration has a higher threshold than either 
Deutsch's or Haas' definition. By using the term threshold 
Etzioni is clearly referring to integration as a condition 
that comes into being when a certain threshold is passed. 
Etzioni's concept of integration is related to the existence 
of political communities as opposed to political systems 
which are "interdependent" rather than "integrated."^ A 
"political community" or a community which is politically 
integrated has 
. . . three kinds of integration: (a) it has an 
effective control over the use of the means of violence; 
(b) it has a center of decision-making that is able to 
affect significantly the allocation of resources and 
rewards throughout the community; (c) it is the dominant 
focus of political identification for the large majority 
of politically aware citizens.9 
Etzioni sums up with, "A political community is thus 
a state, an administrative-economic unit, and a focal point 
of identification."-^ 
Clearly Etzioni's threshold is high and his concept 
of integration is more rigorous than that of Deutsch or Haas 
Haas' definition roughly corresponds to Etzioni's second 
kind of integration. Haas' process whereby political actors 
in different settings "shift their loyalties to a new center 
would at its culmination result in a condition much like 
Etzioni's condition B, "a center of decision-making that is 
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able to affect . . . the allocation of resources and rewards 
throughout the community." 
By concentrating on the earlier definitions of inte¬ 
gration given by Deutsch, Haas, and Etzioni, a glimpse of 
the complexity involved in the formulation of a composite or 
umbrella definition of integration has been given. Were it 
not for the works of authors such as Joseph Nye or Charles 
Pentland which have already undertaken a survey of integra¬ 
tion theory and an analysis and comparison of existing 
definitions any work seeking to apply a most definition of 
integration to a particular context would be almost immeasur¬ 
ably more difficult. Indeed, Deutsch, Haas, and Etzioni, in 
their early writings were talking about a type of political 
integration. Though a scholarly comparison and evaluation of 
the many approaches to the definition of integration is worth¬ 
while, to a certain extent it already has been attempted. 
Furthermore, regional integrative development obviously 
addresses itself to economic as well as political variables. 
Though one may be tempted, it would not be appropriate to 
raise the controversy surrounding the distinction and over¬ 
lap between politics and economics. It will suffice to say 
that economic integration is a type of integration that has 
relevance to integrative development. Etzioni's "category 
B" of integration (center of decision-making that is able to 
affect significantly the allocation of resources and rewards 
. . . ) can easily be seen as a general description of the 
result of a process of economic integration. 
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Before moving to the subject of economic integration, 
a comment on the nature of integration is appropriate. As 
discussed above, integration is seen as a process or a condi¬ 
tion. Though one might argue the ontology of integration as 
a thing in itself, our concern is less with integration in 
itself and more with a definition that is suitable for a 
particular theory. In that the theory in discussion is a 
prescriptive theory, the process of integration must precede 
the hoped for condition. This does not preclude Etzioni's 
definition, it simply emphasizes those policies, programs, 
and actions necessary to the attainment of the hoped for 
condition. The aim of the prescriptions to be derived is 
not integration for itself, rather the fruits brought forth 
by an active process of integrative development. For that 
reason integration will henceforth be seen as a process. 
Furthermore, the distinction is slight, because process and 
condition are only ways of conceptualizing. No condition is 
absolutely static and no process is completely fluid. What 
is important to the definition of integration must be 
extracted from those theorists who perceive integration as 
a condition as well as those who perceive integration as a 
process. The discussion of integration will not stray from 
the over-arching necessity to create a working system for 
the provision of integration and development in the Arab 
region. 
Joseph Nye has written. 
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. . . a more fruitful approach is to break apart the 
concept of integration, develop concrete measurements for 
its component parts, and leave the relationship between 
them open for empirical verification. The concept of 
integration (defined as forming parts into a whole) can 
be broken down into economic integration (formation of 
a transnational economy), social integration (formation 
of a transnational society), and political integration 
(formation of a transnational political system).H 
It is obvious that economic integration has relevance 
to the prospects of regional integrative development. Though 
integration, in the typology of Nye, has three major compo¬ 
nents and definitions appropriate to each component, regional 
integrative development will be defined as a subset of 
economic integration which subsumes social and political 
integration as background conditions. Thus, the definition 
of integration will be approached from the economic per¬ 
spective, and supported by the concepts inherent in political 
and social integration. 
Integration may be defined in general terms, an 
expression of the concept of unification; or if broken into 
components, integration may be defined with specific reference 
to particular events, practices, and relationships. Economic 
integration relates to a set of established approaches or 
definitions which rely upon many quantifiable or emergent 
characteristics. Trade volume can be measured. The 
existence of a regional organization is readily observable. 
A tangible set of characteristics can be ascribed to a defi¬ 
nition of economic integration. Literature pertinent to 
economic integration is abundant. The narrowing focus of 
definition moves through the broad field of integration into 
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the mid-level of economic integration. The collation of 
concepts at the broadest level of integration theory serves 
as the foundation for the definition of economic integration. 
Galtung's aforementioned definition of integration, 
"the process whereby two or more actors form a new actor" 
is sufficient for the foundation of the concept of integration 
Deutsch's "refined" definition expands the concept of 
integration to the level of systems theory, but really adds 
little to the foundation of the concept. Actually Deutsch's 
earlier definition which required "dependable expectations 
of peaceful change" builds upon Galtung's foundation by 
introducing the value of peaceful relations between units as 
a particular characteristic of integration. Etzioni's first 
condition, "effective control over the use of violence" is 
perhaps too strong for a definition of integration that is 
to be used as the basis for regional integrative development 
in the Arab region. Vie have already noted that Etzioni's 
notion of a "center of decision-making that is able to affect 
significantly the allocation of resources and rewards" could 
be the result of economic integration, but again, our 
definition of economic integration cannot depend upon a 
hoped for result for its substance; the definition must 
accommodate the process by which a result is to be achieved. 
The result of regional integrative development cannot 
presuppose the prescription. The definition of economic 
integration is needed to narrow integration further so that 
it can serve as a bridge to the narrowest and most precise 
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definition of the type of integration necessary for regional 
integrative development. By defining the type of integra¬ 
tion necessary to regional integrative development, the 
prescriptions for that type of integration become evident. 
The definition of integration capable of providing incentives 
for peace and development in the Arab region must take into 
account all of the variables and circumstances inherent in 
the Middle Eastern situation. The purpose for the tedious 
deductive derivation of definition from the general to the 
specific is to guarantee the widest input into the process 
of prescription. A definition of integration derived 
inductively from the variables and circumstances inherent in 
the Middle Eastern situation might not contain sufficient 
external input to serve as a prescription. Prescriptions, 
more often than not, must be derived from external inputs. 
Induction would only extrapolate from the facts as they are 
and not from conditions as they should be. 
Fortunately, much work has been done in the area of 
economic integration from which a definition can be deduced. 
Bela Belassa's definition of economic integration is perhaps 
best known and will be dealt with directly later. Now, to 
expedite the process of collation, an already derived 
collation will be cited. Again it is Joseph Nye who most 
concisely states the point. Nye advances the progress of 
definitional derivation by adding the concept of regionalism 
to economic integration. Though this may seem a little like 
placing the cart before the horse, it must be reemphasized 
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that the task at hand is the arrival of the reader at 
prescriptions, not a comprehensive treatise on every politi¬ 
cal variable that might be encountered. A definition of 
regionalism will be forthcoming, but at this point we must 
assume that region used in the context of regional economic 
integration will not present insurmountable problems to the 
reader. At the risk of sounding parenthetical, regionalism 
will have a greater bearing on the later discussion of the 
effect of superpower incursion on the prospects of regional 
integrative development in the Arab region. 
Nye writes. 
Regional economic integration is not a simple con¬ 
cept. The formation of a regional transnational economy 
involves considerations of welfare and considerations of 
interdependence, and the two are not exactly the same. 
For example, a degree of protection may create a trans¬ 
national economy among a group of countries in the sense 
of increasing their interdependence in trade or flow of 
factors of production. Indeed, production may be 
necessary to prevent the countries in the region from 
being integrated into the global economy or into other 
partial transnational economies. But if the effects of 
trade diversion exceed those of trade creation (assuming 
no important dynamic effects), there may be a net loss 
in regional welfare. From the viewpoint of a liberal 
economist concerned only with the welfare effects of the 
optimal allocation of regional resources that a perfect 
market mechanism would produce, it would seem undesirable 
to call the results of such protection "integration."12 
Nye has suggested the complexity of regional economic 
integration. In the preceding quotation Nye introduced the 
concept of trade diversion. Trade diversion will demonstrate 
a point about complexity in developmental integration. 
Suliman Demir defines trade diversion in the context of its 
opposite: trade creation. 
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Trade creation is defined as a shift from high-cost 
to low-cost sources of supply within the integration 
area; trade diversion is a shift from a low-cost source 
of supply outside the integration area to a high-cost 
producer within it.13 
The classical definition of economic integration is 
provided by Bela Balassa in his book Economic Integration. 
Balassa's five categories, or stages of integration are the 
starting points for most debate on the subject of economic 
integration; however, before directly discussing those cate¬ 
gories, let us first examine further the concept of trade 
diversion as it applies to developing regions. Trade diver¬ 
sion would in a "classical" situation be a severe obstacle to 
integration. Of course other obstacles exist, but trade 
diversion will serve as a good example of the modification 
necessary to adopt classical theory to the developing 
context. 
Trade Diversion 
Trade diversion occurs because of several reasons. 
The transfer of technology from industrial to lesser developed 
countries (LDC's) is often the transfer of relatively obso¬ 
lete design and equipment. Industrial nations have a vested 
interest in their technology and the transnational corpora¬ 
tions (TNC's) operate on the profit motive. The TNC1s will 
not sell controlling interest in their most advanced tech¬ 
nology to LDC's if it is more profitable to retain the best 
means of production. Also, if an economically integrating 
region has an insufficient market to reduce the price of a 
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locally produced item by providing an economy of scale, then 
those items will be more expensive than items produced in 
countries with economies of scale and access to world mar¬ 
kets. The result of a relatively obsolete industrial plant 
and the absence of an economy of scale is trade diversion. 
If trade diversion in a region outweighs trade 
creation then the impetus toward regional economic integra¬ 
tion is stymied, but not necessarily stopped. The decision- 
makers in a developing region must determine if the relative 
disincentive of trade diversion is outweighed by the benefits 
of developing industries within the region. Global equations 
of comparative advantage do not necessarily balance when 
calculated by regional elites. Arguments can be and have 
been made for the protection of infant industries, or 
industries in developing nations or regions, that without 
protection would otherwise be unable to operate. 
An example of trade diversion would occur if by 
agreement nations in an underdeveloped region decided to pro¬ 
duce refrigerators, and deny refrigerators produced outside 
the region access to the regional market through the use of 
a prohibitive common external tariff. If in this case the 
regionally produced refrigerators cost more than the exter¬ 
nally produced refrigerators, then this would be an example 
of trade diversion. But what would the effects of trade 
diversion be, and how does trade diversion bear upon the 
question of regional integrative development? 
The regionally produced refrigerators would cost 
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regional consumers more than the externally produced refrig¬ 
erators, tying up more capital in the absolute consumption 
of refrigerators. However, regional manufacturers, workers, 
and middlemen would earn money that would otherwise leave 
the region. The complexity of analysis is overwhelming, and 
seemingly unanswerable questions are raised. 
Integration may simply be seen as making one out of 
many. Economic integration is the merging of many economies 
into one. There are many impediments to successful integra¬ 
tion in the Arab region. Trade diversion analysis is just 
such an obstacle. Can national consumers be convinced or 
coerced into foregoing the purchase of less expensive and 
often more attractive goods in favor of more expensive 
regionally produced items? To what degree should coercion 
be applied to the promotion of regionally produced goods? At 
what point does the cost/benefit ratio of regional industry 
protection reach the level relative negativity? No specific 
answers can be provided for such general questions, but that 
the questions must be asked clearly demonstrates the 
problems that can occur when an aspect of a classical inte¬ 
gration theory is applied to a developing region. 
General definitions become less valuable as RID 
theory seeks to specifically address itself to and gain its 
validation from a particular region. A move toward the 
specific shears away the intellectual excess baggage of 
generalization and brings into focus the Arab region. What 
is required is an ever-increasing level of specificity which 
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is consistent with antecedent theory and the ever-increasing 
detail that is encountered as the process of theory building 
leaves the comfortable generalities of integration theory 
and enters into the sticky realities of integration efforts 
in the Arab region. The prospect of trade diversion is an 
impediment to regional economic integration. As an impedi¬ 
ment, trade diversion shears off those parts of a definition 
of regional economic integration which fail to consider trade 
diversion. Furthermore, by no means is trade diversion the 
only impediment to regional economic integration in the Arab 
region. Political and economic impediments abound. Ideologi¬ 
cal conflict, different levels of development, unequal dis¬ 
tribution of natural resources, historic national conflicts, 
insufficient economic infrastructure, unequal distribution 
of labor, and export oriented economies are but a few of the 
more obvious impediments to economic integration in the Arab 
region. Each impediment spawns a prescription. 
With a hint of the impediments to regional economic 
integration extant, the definition which is to be modified 
into a definition of Regional Integrative Development can be 
placed upon the carving board. 
As previously mentioned, the economist Bela Balassa 
has created five categories for economic integration. 
Balassa's categories correspond to progressives stages of 
integration and are distinguished by specific characteristics. 
The table below illustrates Balassa's categories. 
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BALASSA'S CATEGORIES OF 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Uni fica- 
Harmon- tion of 
No Free i zation Policies, 
Tariff Common Flow of Political 
or External of Economic Ins ti- 
Quotas Tari ffs Factors Policies tutions 
1. Free Trade 
Area x 
2. Customs 
Union X 
3. Common 
Market X 
4. Economic 
Union X 
5. Total 
Economic 
Integration X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X X 
X X X X 
Source: Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration. 
Though the table is somewhat self explanatory, it 
should be reemphasized that the five categories are presented 
as a natural progression, each stage a prerequisite for the 
following stage. Nye has problems with this. 
At first glance the Balassa categories appear to be 
particularly suitable for use by political scientists. 
The first two categories correspond to the legal cate¬ 
gories of Article 24 of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, while the last refers explicitly to political 
institutional criteria and thus relates economic inte¬ 
gration to political integration. On the other hand. 
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there are a number of problems involved in using only 
this approach. For one thing, the popular usage of many 
of the terms can be misleading. The "common market" 
label is more widely applied than practiced—witness the 
so-called Arab Common Market. A cynic might say that 4^ 
regional economic schemes are more common than market.14 
Nye raises three other objections to Balassa's 
definitional categories: the categories do not consider 
planned economies; the categories have only trade related 
definitions and fail to consider shared services; and the 
categories are formal, not behavioral. (Though the frame¬ 
work for trade exists, trade, itself, may not.) Nye 
further distinguishes "Economic Integration" into EI^ or 
trade interdependence and EIS or shared services.!^ 
Obviously trade diversion is an obstacle to Elt but 
does not interfere with EIS. The development of regional 
services allows limited resources to be applied efficiently. 
Services also tend to be apolitical, and thus encounter less 
resistance. 
Soliman Demir has commented on the relevance of 
comprehensive integration schemes in the Arab region, and in 
doing so reverts back to Balassa's categories as his point 
of embarkation. To begin with, Demir also uses Balassa as 
the source for a definition of economic integration. Demir's 
reference to Balassa clearly defines each of the categories. 
Economic integration is conventionally defined as a 
process and a state of affairs. As a process, it encom¬ 
passes various measures abolishing discrimination between 
economic units belonging to different national states; 
viewed as a state of affairs, it can be represented by 
the absence of various forms of discrimination between 
national economies. 
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As a process economic integration would have pro¬ 
gressing stages that culminate in total economic inte¬ 
gration. Balassa, one of the often quoted specialists 
on the subject, distinguishes among the following forms 
of economic integration: 
(a) a free trade area, where tariffs and quantitative 
restrictors between the participating countries 
are abolished, but each country retains its own 
tariffs against non-members; 
(b) a customs union, which unifies the tariffs of 
integration partners against non-members; 
(c) a common market, which allows for the free move¬ 
ment of factors of production (not only commodi¬ 
ties as in (a) and (b), among the integration 
partners; 
(d) an economic union, which entails a degree of 
harmonization of economy, monetary, fiscal, 
social, and countercyclical policies among mem¬ 
ber countries; 
(e) total economic integration, which presupposes 
the unification of economic, fiscal, and other 
policies, and requires the setting up of a supra¬ 
national authority whose decisions are binding 
for member states. (Source: Balassa, The Theory 
of Economic Integration.)16 
The Arab nations have experience with a comprehensive 
effort at integration in the Arab Common Market. The use¬ 
fulness of comprehensive integration schemes for developing 
nations has been widely challenged. Demir's comment is, 
The movement toward integration in developing 
countries through generalized trade liberalization 
(i.e., comprehensive integration schemes), has not pro¬ 
duced any particularly bright or successful examples. 
There are political as well as economic difficulties 
surrounding the implementation of comprehensive integra¬ 
tion schemes based on trade liberal!zation.17 
John Renninger, an expert on West African integra¬ 
tion efforts for the United Nations Institute for Training 
and Research (UNITAR) has observed. 
The free trade areas, common markets, economic 
unions and other types of regional economic integration 
schemes raised hope that they would result in rapid 
economic growth in the countries involved. With few 
exceptions, the schemes failed to live up to these 
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early expectations. Difficulties of various kinds were 
encountered, and by the early 1970,s the enthusiasm for 
such schemes had diminished.-1-8 
The Arab experience with a common market is best 
expressed by Dr. John Munro. 
Certainly there is everything to be said for the 
idea of an Arab Common Market, an idea which received 
its first important regional sanction at the Arab League 
Economic Council Meeting in 1961, when it was proposed 
to translate national planning into regional planning. 
Under the Economic Unity Agreement, the Arab Economic 
Unity Council was given the task of preparing a blue¬ 
print, which would enable the Arabs to coordinate their 
economic development, prepare programs for the realisa¬ 
tion of joint Arab development projects, and draw up 
proposals which would lead to the coordination of the 
agricultural, industrial and trade policies of the 
member countries. Unfortunately the Council's work was 
soon bogged down by political hassles, and fifteen years 
later, though some progress had been made, the Arab 
Common Market is more of a Platonic ideal in the 
economists' minds than a tangible reality.19 
There is little doubt that the Arab region wants to 
promote integration, the efforts are manifest, the question 
is: What are the proper means to successfully integrate the 
Arab efforts for development? 
Suliman Demir offers an answer. 
The project approach to economic integration has 
been perceived as an appropriate vehicle for institu¬ 
tional cooperation and possibly higher integration at a 
later stage. One of the apparent advantages for project 
cooperation is that countries partner to the scheme of 
cooperation retain their control over economic affairs 
almost intact. Secondly, the gains and losses to the 
various partners are more readily identified and agree¬ 
ment on compensatory schemes can be easily reached. 
Moreover project cooperation entails on embarking on new 
activities of production and investment in cooperating 
countries, rather than redistribution and reallocation 
of existing utilized capacities. This last reason should 
be appealing to most developing countries, particularly 
in the case of the Arab region.20 
A program of integration based on projects rather 
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than trade will enhance the motivation of national actors. 
If the development of regional services and industry is 
pursued, then the very tangible benefits of electrification, 
improved transportation, education, and health program 
coupled with a substantial supportive infrastructure will 
promote the acceptance of integration. 
Regional Integrative Development will thus be defined 
by the application of general economic integration theory 
to the special requirements of a developing region. Regional 
Integrative Development is a program of development that 
seeks to offset the short term problems inherent in regional 
economic integration among developing nations by promoting 
regional industrial, infrastructure, and service projects. 
Regional Integrative Development (RID) has been 
defined through a process of derivation; however, RID theory 
must be developed in the context of its antecedent theories. 
Definition is a priori and somewhat arbitrary; theory 
building, though contingent upon definition, must draw upon 
the backlog of integration theory for its substance. To 
ignore the labors of Mitrany, Deutsch, Haas, Etzioni, 
Balassa, and the host of scholars devoted to the discipline 
of integration would be academic blindness. The evolution 
of a discipline may bring a student to a highly differenti¬ 
ated subdiscipline (in the sense that RID theory is a subset 
of integration theory) but only after homage is paid to the 
founders of the original discipline. Far from being 
academic ritual, the identification and exegesis of the 
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founding theories of integration establishes the language 
and concepts of a Prescriptive Theory of Regional Integra- 
tive Development. However, once a theoretical framework is 
established, the identification of prescriptions will derive 
from the regional context using theory as a vehicle. 
CHAPTER III 
COLLATION OF INTEGRATION THEORIES 
A study of integration theory should begin with 
David Mitrany. Mitrany, the British political scientist, 
is often described as a dreamer and a poet? in any case, 
Mitrany is the acknowledged father of functional integration. 
Influenced by the early Fabians, Leonard Woolf, G. D. H. 
Cole and Norman Angell, Mitrany gave substance to functional- 
ism in his book, A Working Peace System. In his book Mitrany 
states, 
The task that is facing us is how to build up the 
reality of a common interest in peace. . . . Not to 
build a peace that would keep nations quietly apart, but 
a peace that would bring them actively together; not the 
old static and strategic view of peace but a social view 
of it. ... We must put our faith not in a protected 
but a working peace; it would indeed be nothing more or 
less than the idea of social security taken in its 
widest range.1 
Ernst Haas in his opus Beyond the Nation-State 
defines the ambition of the functionalists, 
Functionalists, in the specific sense of the term, 
are interested in identifying those aspects of human 
needs and desires that exist and clamor for attention 
outside the realm of the political. They believe in the 
possibility of specifying technical and "non-controver¬ 
sial" aspects of governmental conduct, and of weaving an 
ever-spreading web of international relationships on the 
basis of meeting such needs. They would concentrate on 
commonly experienced needs initially, expecting the 
circle of non-controversial to expand at the expense of 
the political, as practical cooperation became coterminus 
with the totality of interstate relations. At that 
point a true world community will have arisen.2 
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Mitrany makes a clear distinction between the politi¬ 
cal and the technological. To Mitrany peace can be achieved 
if man organizes around the common, shared needs for public 
health, transportation, agricultural development, etc., and 
downplays the vargaries balance of power, diplomacy, mili¬ 
tarism, and what may be described as mankind's darker desire 
for dominance. Mitrany's optimism is based on the assumption 
that man's darker nature is a product of "social and economic 
maladjustments." Chadwick Alger extracts what he perceives 
to be the basic assumptions of functionalism found in Mitrany1 
writings. 
1. Social and economic maladjustments are the basic 
causes of war. 
2. Social and economic welfare is the precondition 
of peace. 
3. The nation-state system cannot deal with basic 
social and economic problems because global society is 
arbitrarily divided into units based on territory rather 
than units based on problems to be solved. 
4. Institutions based on function, not territory, 
would be appropriate for solving basic social and econo¬ 
mic problems. 
5. Functional cooperation can begin with non- 
political, more technical problems. 
6. Co-operative experience gained in one functional 
area can be transferred to another. 
7. Co-operation will extend to more and more 
functions to the point that a "web of international 
activities and agencies" will "overlay political 
divisions." 
8. Ultimately these agencies will require coordi¬ 
nating bodies, which will eventually require planning 
agencies, which will eventually evolve into a general 
authority for over-all co-ordination.3 
Functionalism would have nationalism replaced by 
organizations which respond to the needs of humanity. The 
organizations would address specific needs and would allow 
for a withering away of the state. Quoting Haas again, 
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Instead of attacking nationalism and sovereignty 
frontally, the Functionalist aims at solving these 
problems by simply ignoring them and relying on the 
systemic forces and a learning process for eventually 
transcending, rather than defeating, the old order.^ 
After the transcendence of the nation-state, a world 
government would be possible. We must now question the 
relevance of functional integration, with its global per¬ 
spective, to the Arab region. In answer to this question it 
must be first noted that Functionalism is a starting point 
for the general theory of integration. Federalism, Pluralism, 
and Neo-functionalism will be discussed in turn, with each 
approach adding substance and direction to the final synthe¬ 
sis. It must also be noted that Functionalism, with a global 
perspective of non-controversial integration can with a few 
expressed reservations be applied to a regional context. 
Chadwick Alger explains, 
Mitrany drew insight from the experience of public inter¬ 
national bodies dealing with health, transport and 
communication, which emerged in the nineteenth century, 
as well as from functional activity within nation-states 
where he observed that fascination with constitutions 
and central authority often obscured more basic processes 
of national integration. By doing so he provided con¬ 
ceptual linkage that made it possible to apply a wide 
range of social science knowledge to problems in inter¬ 
national organization--with respect to attitudes, 
loyalties, socialization, learning, communication, over¬ 
lapping membership groups, etc. But it remained for the 
scholars working under the rubric of regional integration 
explicitly to identify and explore these linkages.^ 
Functionalism is criticized in many corners because 
it seemingly ignores the concept of power. Haas states, 
We can easily summarize the criticism leveled at 
Functionalism by writers in the Realist tradition: they 
merely assert the primacy of the political and take for 
granted the presumed hard outer shell of the sovereign 
nation-state.6 
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This direct criticism of Functionalism is appropriate 
to its application to the Arab region. In a personal inter¬ 
view of the Arab League's ambassador to the United Nations, 
the ambassador. Dr. Helmi, criticized the weakness of mind 
that causes man to generalize and many to lump all of the 
Arab nations together.^ National interests and divisions 
exacerbated by the presence of intrusive powers are powerful 
adversaries to regional cooperation.® Functionalism is not, 
however, blind to nationalism. Functionalism recognizes 
nationalism as an obstacle that is better ignored than 
antagonized. Unlike Federalism which attacks nationalism 
head on, Functionalism, in a nearly Taoist way, promotes 
activities which wear away the power of the nation-state 
through the provision of services to citizens of the state. 
Power is not denied, it is simply avoided. It is this avoid¬ 
ance of power that spawns a more germane critique of 
Functionalism. 
Ernst Haas, drawing on the works of J. P. Sewell and 
Inis Claude, remarks that the Functionalists' separation of 
power and welfare is untenable. 
Power and welfare are far from separable. Indeed, 
commitment to welfare activities arises only within the 
confines of purely political decisions, which are made 
largely on the basis of power considerations.9 
Mitrany was not unaware of his critics and in 1972 
wrote in an article entitled "A Political Theory for a New 
Society," 
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In the international sphere its (Functionalism) 
scope must be ... to concentrate sectors of activity 
under some collective authority, and so build up 
gradually, the substance of an international society and 
of international government; until at a deeper level the 
two sides merge to the same purpose. Political world 
government is not possible but common government is both 
possible and necessary in those things which need to be 
governed in common.10 
Rather than attempt a definition of power, in the 
case of Functionalism it will suffice to say that power is 
not exclusively drawn from nationalism, and if gradualism is 
adopted there is at least a reasonable chance that the power 
of reason, upon which Functionalism depends, will eventually 
prevail. In the Arab region there may be sufficient finan¬ 
cial power in the form of petrodollars associated with 
rational approaches to development and cooperation, to make 
Functionalism practical. Admittedly nothing is guaranteed 
but it is difficult to argue against a theory which promotes 
welfare and cooperation. It becomes even more difficult to 
argue against such a theory if its sponsors within a region 
have vast financial resources. 
A second criticism of Functionalism concerns its 
lack of a clearly defined end. If functional integration 
occurs globally then what, indeed, will be the nature of the 
end product? Functionalism provides a means to an end but 
leaves the end, itself, to be defined. It can be argued to 
Functionalism, if practiced might not lead to an integrated 
whole. What assurance is there that Functionalism will not 
spawn new regional, rather than global centers? What would 
the effect of regional organization be on world peace? Again 
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the scholastic debate on this question alone is worthy of 
more space than this study is prepared to give. 
As stated earlier, in the Arab context, regional 
functional integration could provide positive incentives for 
peace. In the long run, the survival of Israel and the 
creation of a lasting peace cannot depend on the disharmony 
and the relative underdevelopment of the Arab people. It is 
one of man's nobler ideas that development and cooperation 
are contagious. 
Robert McDonald writes about two divergent approaches 
to regionalism, 
Two divergent approaches to regionalism could be 
discerned: (1) regionalism as an approach to inter¬ 
national security, by means of an implicit or explicit 
Great Power hegemony, and (2) regional functional inte¬ 
gration by means of intra-regional cooperation in the 
field of economics, cultural activities, and social 
affairs on a level assumed to transcend politics.H 
Inherent in the second approach to regionalism defined 
by McDonald is the supposition that intra-regional cooperation 
would promote global security. If developing regions can 
cooperate with themselves and with the industrial regions 
then peace will be promoted. The complexity of global 
dynamics precludes any South-South and North-South pre¬ 
dictions; nevertheless, some generalizations have been 
attempted. Rosenbaum and Tyler write, 
A central dimension of South-South relation ... is 
that they are normally shaped by North-South relations. 
The international economic system's four functional areas-- 
monetary, trade, investment, and aid--provide a constella¬ 
tion of issues capable of stimulating consensual and con- 
flictual relations among the LDC's, but these relations 
generally are also conditioned by North-South relations.12 
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Rosenbaum and Tyler go on to say, 
A major cause of South-South relations has been the 
discovery by LDC1s that they confront common problems 
with their relations with the North. International 
and regional organizations have played a major role in 
aggregating LDC interests.13 
Regional functional integration can be seen as a 
process of aggregation which creates larger units imbued with 
forward linkage to an ultimate global system. A purely 
Functionalist view would argue the point. 
According to many functionalists . . . the integration 
theorists have taken a fundamentally wrong turn--toward 
a narrow pre-occupation with the building of massively 
bureaucrat!zed regional super-states--which has led them 
away from the central issue of world order.14 
If, in fact, the Arab region were to become a 
"massively bureaucratized regional super-state", then world 
order might be threatened by any of the hypothetical con¬ 
flicts below: 
1. Arab-Israeli leading to superpower conflict 
2. Arab-African on the horn of Africa 
3. Arab-Persian over the oil fields 
4. Arab-Soviet on ideological grounds 
5. Arab-OECD on the price of oil 
It is quite possible to fantasize any number of 
holocausts, but in reality, the probability of any conflict 
can be diminished by the existence of rational decision 
making organizations whose interests in stability would temper 
any potential conflict. Furthermore, if regional function- 
alism anticipates possible conflict through the initiation 
of multi-regional, and peripheral cooperation then world 
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order is greatly enhanced. Regional functional integration 
thus becomes a strong leg upon which Regional Integrative 
Development stands. 
A brief discussion of Federalism is required because 
of the attempts at federation which have taken place with 
the Arab region. In 19 50 the members of the Arab league 
signed a pact which was to have led to military and economic 
unification.The United Arab Republic was formed in 1958. 
On April 17, 1971 the Quadripartite Summit in Cairo led to 
an agreement to form the Federation of Arab Republics. 
The one thing all of these efforts have in common is that 
they failed. The reasons for failure are manifold. Amitai 
Etzioni's chapter, "A Union That Failed: The United Arab 
Republic (1958-1961)" in his book Political Unification 
accounts both historically and theoretically for the failure 
of the UAR. Etzioni's concluding sentences in the chapter 
are provocative. 
. . . the ease with which the UAR tumbled reflected 
a thinness of the political basis for this particular 
union. But what actually tumbled was the institutional 
structure, while the building stones of the union--to 
the degree they were ever available--remained basically 
intact.17 
The Federation of Arab Republics was apparently 
built with the same stones but in the case of the FAR, the 
mortar was even weaker. 
Federalism results in the creation of a supra¬ 
national state. Charles Pentland describes the simplicity 
of Federalism, 
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The classic federalist picture of international inte¬ 
gration has the same deceptive clarity and simplicity 
as Hobbes1 description of the birth of Leviathan. The 
essence of the integrative process, according to this 
view, is the formation, among a group of previous 
sovereign powers, of a common supranational state.18 
Federalism conflicts with sovereignty thus is best 
pursued in political conflict, revolution or post-colonial 
turmoil. Federalism is, by its nature, dramatic. It would 
be easy to say the last hope of an Arab federation died with 
Nasser. The liberation of the Arab states from their 
colonial masters recedes into history, and the charismatic 
liberators pass from the scene. But conditions can change 
rapidly. The ripeness of history is difficult to judge. 
Was Muhammad anticipated? An Arab federation is not impossi¬ 
ble, it is only unlikely. Furthermore, it is conceivable 
that an effort to force an Arab federation could have dis¬ 
astrous effects. Federalism is best approached indirectly. 
,Neo-functionalism is just such an indirect approach. 
Lindberg and Scheingold distinguish neofunctionalism from 
functionalism according to neofunctionalism1s approach to 
the nation-state. 
Neofunctionalism differs from traditional function- 
alism in that it establishes some prerequisites to 
effective problem solving which involve a partial but 
direct threat to the autonomy of the nation-state.19 
The linkage between Federalism and neofunctionalism 
is in their common goal to "transcend the nation-state." 
They differ in their strategies to achieve the goal: 
Federalists using political means; neofunctionalists using 
economic means.^ Neofunctionalism does not, however, avoid 
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political interaction as does Functionalism. 
The essence of the neofunctionalist argument is that 
political integration comes about less through pressures 
from functional needs or technological change as such, 
and more through the interaction of political forces-- 
interest groups, parties, governments, international 
agencies—which seek to exploit those pressures in pur¬ 
suit of their own interests.21 
Certainly in the Arab region, or any region for that 
matter, political forces are at work. But perhaps more so 
in the Arab region than any other region, there exists a 
great potential for the application of those political forces 
to problems of regional development. A neofunctionalist 
approach with its manifest encroachment on sovereignty could 
divert attention from development to a perceived attack on 
the nation-state, or worse yet, create the impression among 
the oil-poor states that the oil-rich states were attempting 
to buy their sovereignty. The wisdom of Functionalism is 
that it avoids confrontation with those whose power is 
derived from the nation-state. Far from being politically 
naive, the Functionalist in the Arab region may show the 
greatest political sagacity. 
The fourth major approach to integration is 
pluralism. Karl Deutsch defines the product of integration 
as a security-community. 
A SECURITY-COMMUNITY is a group of people which has 
become "integrated." 
By INTEGRATION we mean the attainment, within a 
territory, of a "sense of community and of institutions 
and practices" strong enough and widespread enough to 
assure for a "long time" dependable expectations of 
"peaceful change" among its population. 
By SENSE OF COMMUNITY we mean a belief on the part 
of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement 
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on at least this one point: that common social problems 
must and can be resolved by processes of "peaceful 
change." 
By PEACEFUL CHANGE we mean the resolution of social 
problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, 
without resort to large-scale physical force.22 
Deutsch goes on to define and differentiate amalga¬ 
mated and pluralistic security communities. 
By AMALGAMATION we mean the formal merger of two or 
more previously independent units into a single larger 
unit, with some type of common government after amalga¬ 
mation . . . 
The PLURALISTIC security-community, on the other 
hand, retains the legal independence of separate 
governments.2 3 
The relevance of Deutsch's pluralism to Regional 
Integrative Development among the Arab nations lies in the 
sequential definition of a pluralistic security community. 
Pentland notes, 
For those who, like Deutsch, are mindful of the 
tenacity of the nation-state and concerned primarily 
with preserving peace in the international system, the 
less ambitious but more stable pluralistic form of 
community must seem both a pragmatic and realistic 
aspiration.24 
If development is to be pursued then sense of 
community with an expectation of peaceful change must exist 
as a precondition to investment in the region. A pluralistic 
security-community is the only viable alternative for the 
same reasons that an Arab Federation is unlikely: the 
sovereignty of the nation-state. 
This chapter has only touched upon the four classic 
approaches to integration theory: functionalism; federalism; 
neofunctionalism; and, pluralism. 
However, each of the four approaches has deposited 
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concepts into the Prescriptive Theory for Integrative 
Development. Without question, functionalism is the basis 
for integrative development. In both functionalism and 
Regional Integrative Development, common welfare is the 
point of coalescence; but RID differs from pure functionalism 
in that it seeks to address regional welfare. Though RID is 
development or project oriented, it requires the creation of 
functional organizations. RID employs political power to 
achieve welfare objectives but does not challenge sovereignty. 
RID presupposes the conditions inherent in a pluralistic 
security-community but through its program of development 
enhances regional cohesion. RID defines its objectives in 
social and economic terms and leaves the political outcome 
to its natural conclusion. 
The juxtaposition of classical integration theory 
with development theory is simplified by the collation which 
has already taken place. Charles Issawi has written in his 
article, "Growth and Structural Change in the Middle East," 
that four obstacles exist to development in the Middle East. 
These are: 
1. Arab-Israeli War 
2. defense spending conditioned by tensions 
3. the reduction of efficiency caused by extension 
in the public sector 
4. population growth^S 
Jahagir Amuzegar identifies three approaches to 
economic development: Arab socialism, Arab capitalism, and 
Public-Private mixes.^ Mr. Issawi's choice of obstacles 
seems to indicate that he would choose the Arab capitalist 
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approach to development. Economic development theory can be 
approached from either an ideological or technical stand¬ 
point. Mr. Amuzegar looks at development as an ideological 
issue, and Mr. Issawi takes an ideological approach to 
development. Mr. Amuzegar has identified three potentially- 
conflicting approaches to development. Mr. Issawi has 
adopted one of those approaches. Regional Integrative 
Development cannot afford to divide the Arab world into 
three conflicting camps. RID must approach development in 
concrete, technical terms. As stated previously, "The ulti¬ 
mate satisfaction of needs, material or otherwise, of the 
people of a country depends, in the final analysis on pro- 
p 7 
gress achieved xn producing goods and services.' 
The United Nations publication goes on to state, 
"Developments in production, therefore, become the focal 
point in any attempt to review economic and social progress, 
9 P 
or in short, growth."^0 
One aspect of a technical definition of development 
is the identification of economic goals and social goals. 
Whether these goals are approached capitalistically or 
socialistically does not impact the goal outside of the 
relative efficiency and equity of the different approaches. 
Another aspect of a technical definition of develop¬ 
ment is the specification of specific projects through 
objective means which seek to reconcile profit motives with 
social utility. 
Economic and social goals must be defined, and 
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development projects must be identified. The definition of 
economic and social goals must take place within the 
restraints of the attainable, but should be high enough to 
meet the demands of a burgeoning population. The United 
Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia has applied the 
standards set forth in the International Development 
Strategy to a national and regional review of the Middle 
East. National objectives are defined in development plans 
of the nations within the region.The existence of 
nationally defined objectives meets one of the requirements 
for a technical approach to development. 
The identification and prioritization of development 
projects is more difficult as it requires a degree of con¬ 
sensus and compromise. The best approach to the identifica¬ 
tion of projects is the use of project packages with 
detailed implementation plans and realistic schedules of 
completion. By the presentation of packages to investors 
and labor suppliers, trade-offs could be accomplished. 
Regional development should promote consensus and 
compromise; it should not be tied to a particular ideologi¬ 
cal system or predominant national interest. Mr. Amuzegar's 
Public-Private mix on a regional scale may be the best 
approach to development. In the same way that East-West 
trade is often mutually profitable, Arab socialism and Arab 
capitalism can seek an accommodation. 
Hopefully, the theoretical focus has been narrowed 
to the point of clarity. The process of collation was 
dictated by the necessities of the region. The theory has 
been modified by the region; now through the derivation of 
prescriptions the theory will directly engage the region. 
The interaction of the theoretical and the empirical is 
unavoidable. The horizontal collation of diverse theory i 
complete. The vertical collation has reached its final 
stage of specificity requiring only the consistency of the 
prescriptions for completion of the internal validation of 
the theory. 
CHAPTER IV 
APPLICATION OF THEORY 
Having established a theoretical foundation for 
Regional Integrative Development, it is now possible to 
apply the theory to the Arab region itself. Though we have 
previously discussed the "Setting" in Chapter I, this 
earlier discussion was developed only to the point of the 
identification of value premises. The application of 
Regional Integrative Development Theory to the Arab region 
requires the exploration of all factors contributing to or 
detracting from the prospects of integration. In particular, 
special attention must be given to the existing framework of 
regional interdependence and those specific areas where 
development projects are feasible must be identified. 
Furthermore, a good deal of research and speculation concern¬ 
ing regional economic integration and project development 
has already begun, and must be acknowledged. 
Regional Integrative Development has been likened to 
regional functional integration. RID has been further 
limited to programs or projects designed to develop regional 
cooperation. A discussion of the Arab region will enhance 
an understanding of background conditions relevant to RID. 
Regional Integrative Development in the Arab Region 
must be molded to the needs, expectations, and aspirations 
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of an awakening population. RID must consider regional 
P^^tics and inter-state relations; the unique economic and 
demographic distributions within the Arab region; and global 
and hegemonical influences. The prescriptions which evolve 
from this study are developed from theory and given substance 
by the Middle Eastern realities. 
Economic Factors 
Although political cooperation among the Arab 
countries is still of paramount importance in view of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, economic cooperation is 
perceived to be of vital and urgent nature. The Arab 
oil exporting countries are accumulating large financial 
reserves that their economies cannot absorb, while non- 
oil Arab countries experience shortages in financial 
capital and hard currencies.! 
At this point in history, a tremendous opportunity 
exists within the Arab region: the opportunity for regional 
development. At the same time, the inequality of distribu¬ 
tion of oil revenue presents an equally tremendous opportunity 
for regional destabilization and conflict. The petrodollars 
earned by oil exports are accruing at a rate greater than 
the ability of some states in the region to absorb them. An 
influx of dollars can lead to financial chaos within a 
country if that influx is not carefully managed. At present 
many Arab Gulf states are investing heavily in Western 
capital markets. On the other hand, Egypt, Syria, and the 
Sudan are suffering from capital shortages. Internal and 
regional economic destabilization can occur because of the 
appearance of petrodollars. 
There seems to be little agreement on what exactly 
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are the oil reserves present in the Arab region; but, in any 
case, oil reserves are limited and the benefits of petro¬ 
dollars must be maximized. For the potential investor of 
petrodollars, many opportunities are available and if the 
investor is to realize maximum benefit from his petrodollars, 
many factors must be taken into consideration. 
First, one cannot expect an investor, however great 
his identification with the Arab people, to invest in pro¬ 
jects that cannot return a fair amount of profit. Investment 
must be clearly distinguished from charity. Charitable 
contributions are of little more than short term relief for 
economic deprivation. Though valuable in emergencies, 
charitable contributions can do little to provide for future 
contingencies. By purchasing consumable goods and commodities 
with petrodollars, Arab investors would only delay the time 
when the same needs would plague the region. Investment in 
capital goods provides the means for future production. 
Investment in agricultural projects provides the production 
of food for a growing population. Investment in transporta¬ 
tion, electrification, regional services and education pro¬ 
vide the infrastructure for future development. But even 
the aforementioned investments in industry, agriculture, 
transportation, electrification, services and education must 
have the potential to produce a profit. The investor must- 
compare the profitability of short term investments in 
Western capital markets with the profitability of long term 
investments in the Arab region. The argument for short term 
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investment in Western money markets is that petrodollars 
gain high interest and are relatively secure. Investment in 
short term money markets also allows for almost immediate 
access on the part of the investor to his investment. Also 
investment in Western capital markets allows for a certain 
amount of political leverage vis-a-vis the Western 
industrial states whose economic stability greatly depends 
upon recycled petrodollars. 
Profitability of investment must be determined in 
light of other circumstances that modify the wisdom of 
certain approaches to investment. Investment potential must 
be analyzed in the widest possible time frame. Clearly much 
debate has already taken place on the advisability of 
diverse schemes of development, and heated argument has 
transpired over the topics of export strategy versus 
industrialization, regional markets versus the global market, 
free trade versus infant industry protection, but the 
choices of the guardians of the Arab petrodollars are some¬ 
what simpler and less antagonistic. 
Investment in western capital markets protects the 
petrodollars against inflation and at the same time protects 
the viability of the western international economy; however, 
money cannot endlessly buy more money. There must be a time 
of convertibility when money buys goods and services. The 
real question for the Arab investor is what is the proper 
mix of investment and what is the proper timetable for 
convertibility. The western industrialized states are 
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easily seen as the goose whose ability to lay eggs depends 
greatly on its feeding schedule of petrodollars. Though the 
health of the goose is a real concern, this study is 
primarily interested in what to do with the eggs. At 
present there is every indication that Saudi Arabian policy, 
for one, takes into account the health of western economies. 
The real question is what will the long term effects of 
present investment policy be on the stability and viability 
of the Arab region. Albert Gray states the dilemma clearly. 
Wealthy Arabs from the conservative Persian Gulf 
areas are the most likely to invest in Egypt at this 
time. They will do so only if Sadat can convince them 
that there are profits to be made in Egypt, and that 
their investments are secure from nationalization. 
Nasir's socialist policies and his actual sequestration 
of Arab assets in the 1960's dried up this source. It 
will take some time for these funds to start flowing 
again. 
The problem with these private Arab investments when 
they do come in is that they are apt to be concentrated 
in the building of high rise luxury apartments and fancy 
hotels along the Nile. They yield fast profits.3 
Gray's point is that there is great temptation to 
use petrodollars for investments in the already developed 
"luxury sector" of the economy. If in fact petrodollars are 
invested in this manner they are at least providing an input 
into labor markets, and employment and capital to a popula¬ 
tion in need of both. However, it is difficult to dispute 
Gray's inference that the funds could be better spent else¬ 
where . 
John White of the Institute of Development Studies, 
University of Sussex, is perhaps more precise when he 
states, 
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It is reasonable to suppose that the first concern 
of the surplus States is to find investment opportuni¬ 
ties which will yield an acceptable return on their 
resources, i.e., to use the opportunities created by 
oil revenues in a manner which takes into account the 
exhaustibility of the resources from which these 
revenues are derived and which provides the surplus 
States with alternative sources of income to replace 
their wasted assets. It is conceivable that they may 
occasionally enter into large isolated commitments on 
concessionary terms as in some cases they have already 
done, in the manner of any conventional bilateral donor, 
but it is not conceivable that they should enter into a 
general responsibility for underwriting with concession¬ 
ary finance the development programmes of all their 
neighbors.4 
There must be a perceived incentive for oil rich 
states to forego the short term benefits of high profit 
investments in favor of investments which provide the 
opportunity for long term stability. As is the case with 
the choice between investments in western capital markets or 
in the Arab region, petrodollar investors must balance 
immediate profit with the long term need for stability within 
the region. If it were possible to build a model for the 
regional and global economy for the next one hundred years, 
Arab investors could guarantee a maximum return on their 
investment while at the same time maximizing regional develop¬ 
ment; but no such model is possible. First, as stated 
before, the extent of oil reserves is unknown. Second, the 
impact of development on regional stability is problematic. 
It is simplistic to assume that Saudi dollars can buy 
regional harmony. In fact, it is quite possible that 
petrodollars could destabilize the region. Ian Smart in the 
British journal. The World Today, has portrayed just such a 
scenario. 
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In the thinly populated states of the Arabian 
peninsula and the lower Gulf, I would expect the agoniz¬ 
ing choice between accepting manpower shortage as a 
decisive constraint on economic development and inviting 
a possible uncontrollable increase in immigration to be 
particularly disruptive, just as I would expect a growing 
danger of "palace revolutions", ostensibly over policy, 
but actually over the control of the existing system. 
In the more thickly populated Arab oil-producing states 
of the area (Iraq and probably Kuwait), I would expect 
the more serious danger to lie in the obstrusiveness of 
economic differentials and the over-elaboration of 
decision making structures, leading to a much higher 
risk than elsewhere of broadly based social and politi¬ 
cal dissent. (Outside of the Gulf, the case of Libya may 
resemble the former model, while that of Algeria may 
resemble the latter.)5 
In the case of the Saudi's Ramon Knauerhase has 
observed, 
The oil revenues have been a mixed blessing. On one 
hand, they have provided the kingdom with a steady, large 
source of income which has been used to further economic 
development; on the other hand, it has fostered a feeling 
of euphoria, which has made many Saudis unwilling to 
work on anything but government or a few selected 
service jobs. Most Saudis feel that anything can be 
bought.^ 
Knauerhase's observation fits neatly into Smart's scenario. 
If the Saudis will not perform manual tasks at home, imported 
labor will be required. This labor could destabilize Saudi 
society and at the same time the demand for foreign labor 
could easily produce regional resentment as plentiful Saudi 
petrodollars competed in capital starved local labor markets. 
It is absolutely necessary that the unprecedented flow of 
money in the oil rich Arab states be managed in such a way 
as to maintain the presence of local labor and technology in 
those states which are oil poor, or present to those oil 
poor states compensatory viable alternatives to national 
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development. We will return to the question of the 
destabilizing potential of labor movement within the Arab 
region in a following discussion of regional political con¬ 
flict; for now it is sufficient to note that petrodollar 
investment must be approached cautiously and, if possible, 
according to some criteria. 
No comprehensive model is available to guide Arab 
petrodollar investment, but a set of criteria for investment 
has begun to materialize. Ragaei Mallakh and Mihssen Kadhim 
have listed four motives for investment: (1) the political 
motive; (2) the cultural motive; (3) the economic motive; 
and (4) the humanitarian motive.7 
The cultural pressure to invest in the economic 
development of "fellow Arabs" is high.® The following 
quotation illustrates the operation of a regional, social 
dynamic. 
The political and cultural religious motives behind 
Arab oil producer's aid to Arab non-oil producing 
countries are obvious; the people of the two groups 
share close affinities in language, religion, background, 
and history. In fact all Arab countries view themselves 
as part and parcel of the Arab world. Any oil producing 
country, especially if small, finds itself under enor¬ 
mous pressures both from within and from the rest of the 
Arab world to contribute to the economic development of 
fellow Arab people. This explains why such nations as 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwayt and Abu Dhabi consider the orderly 
development of fellow Arab states as an effective 
deterrent to social and political instability within 
the region. 
Moreover, major Arab oil producers, with the possi¬ 
ble exception of Algeria, are labor deficit countries. 
To accelerate their own economic and social development 
they have been relying increasingly on expatriate labor, 
notably, Palestinians, Egyptians, and Lebanese. 
Competition for labor, especially skilled labor, may be 
cited as a potent economic rationale for aid to labor 
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surplus Arab countries. Furthermore, economic coopera¬ 
tion between Arab oil producers and non-oil states, 
Particularly at the commodity and sectoral levels, could 
be of great potential benefit to all parties concerned. 
There is greater realization that cooperation enlarges 
the size of the market and reduces market uncertainty, 
thereby permitting the exploitation of economies of 
scale production. It also allows for specialization 
along the principle of co-operative advantage, contri¬ 
buting to more efficient allocation of resources. 
The recent surge in oil prices created egregious 
disparities in human wealth and human welfare conditions 
between oil haves and have nots. The gulf between these 
two groups is most dramatic in the Arab world. Countries 
with relatively small populations like Abu Dhabi, Qatar, 
Kuwayt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent 
Iraq, suddenly have found themselves with enormous 
financial resources far exceeding their domestic capital 
absorptive capacities (at least in the immediate future), 
while the people of Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, Morocco, Jordan, 
Syria, Tunisia, Somalia, and Mauritania are still living 
close to subsistence or even starvation levels. Thus 
humanitarian considerations reflected in the moral prin¬ 
ciple of relative egalitarianism normally accepted within 
a single country and community must be recognized as an 
important factor in Arab aid giving.9 
The investment of petrodollars must produce both 
profits and regional equity. Profit itself may be abstracted 
from capitalist ideology and viewed as capital formation. 
The ultimate objective of petrodollar investment should be 
the viability of the regional economy in the context of a 
viable global economy. Oil is a wasting resource and is the 
lifeblood of industrial society. If the fruits of the 
industrial age are not to be lost, the oil fields of the 
Middle East must not become a future battleground for 
national, regional, or global adversaries. Efforts to pro¬ 
mote regional stability and integrity will help to ensure 
the steady flow of petroleum to markets throughout the world, 
thereby obviating superpower conflict while improving the 
lives of the regional inhabitants. 
Political Factors 
The presence of intrusive, hegemonical powers within 
the Arab region constitutes the first level of political 
conflict within the Arab region. Cantori and Spiegel iden¬ 
tify nine methods of participation by an intrusive power 
within a region: (1) multilateral arrangements; (2) bilateral 
arrangements; (3) trade and economic investments; (4) pos¬ 
session of a colony; (5) military intervention; (6) subver¬ 
sion; (7) the United Nations; (8) cultural and educational 
activities; (9) propaganda."'"® The United States and the 
Soviet Union employ most of the identified intrusive methods 
to further their respective national interests within the 
Arab region. The struggle for hegemony leads the U.S. and 
U.S.S.R. to seek "clients" in the Middle East."'""'" To the 
degree the superpowers are successful in recruiting clients, 
or imposing their wills upon the policies of Arab states, the 
natural process of regional integration is interrupted by 
injection of extraregional conflict and identification. 
The polarization of Arab states along the issue of Egypt's 
direct negotiations with Israel, specifically Sadat's visit 
to Jerusalem, into rejectionist and moderate camps is 
indicative of the competition between intrusive powers. 
A spin-off of superpower conflict is the conflict 
of economic systems associated respectively with the U.S. 
and U.S.S.R. The caveat that must be expressed is all 
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economic conflict of an ideological nature is not necessarily 
the work of superpowers. Intellectual and political elites 
within the Arab region champion ideologies which are Arab in 
character; that is to say, Arab socialism is not Soviet 
socialism, but not to say Soviet or Chinese socialism have 
not influenced Arab socialist ideology. What is important 
is the relative incompatibility of socialist and capitalist 
economic systems. 
Jahagir Amuzegar remarks in his article, "Ideology 
and Economic Growth in the Middle East", 
In their search for rapid economic development in 
the postwar period, the less developed countries have 
been faced with two main paths to growth, championed by 
two rival ideologies. The "centralists" have stressed 
the importance of comprehensive planning, public owner¬ 
ship and enterprise, heavy industrialization, and a 
reliance on a strong and, if necessary, heavy-handed 
central authority. The "free marketeers", on the other 
hand, have emphasized nearly the opposite: considerable 
economic freedom and initiative for individuals; private 
ownership and operation in all but a few "security- 
sensitive" economic activities; development of a solid 
agricultural base; and a philosophical commitment to 
"democratic institutions", e.g., a multiparty system.12 
Amuzegar goes on to describe Arab socialism as a 
"complex melange of Islamic egalitarianism, Eastern politi¬ 
cal tradition, modern social democracy, latter-day anti- 
1 
colonialism, and a dash of socialist orthodoxy." 
Though it could be plausibly argued that this 
discussion of conflict of economic ideology could be dis¬ 
cussed under the previous heading of "Economic Factors", the 
real impediment to integration is not the "technological" 
problem of meshing divergent systems, rather the political 
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orientation of the elites in power in the respective ideolo¬ 
gical systems and the inability of those elites to accept 
each others solutions to the problems of development. If 
cooperation is to be forged out of this divergence, the basis 
of such cooperation must strive for ideological neutrality. 
The basis for cooperation in the Middle East must appeal to 
the developmental needs of the Arab nations, and thus over¬ 
come the disincentives for unified action. The "freemar- 
keteers" or potential petro-dollar investors must overcome 
their fears of nationalization and doubts about the 
efficiency of socialist economies, while the "centralists" 
or "socialists" must overcome their ideological abhorence of 
the profit motive and latent fears of neo-colonialism. 
Economics and politics are as inextricable in the Middle 
East as they are anywhere else. 
The presence of intrusive powers in the Middle East 
can be placed in an equation which balances external loyalty 
reciprocally with internal cohesion. The intrusion of the 
United States and the Soviet Union in the Arab region can be 
perceived to be detrimental to the process of integration, 
so long as that incursion promotes loyalty which is greater 
to the external intrusive powers than to an Arab integra- 
tive core. The secondary association of Arab economies with 
divergent economical philosophies is a limiting factor on 
the type and extent of integration possible within the region. 
A Pan-Arabist approach to integration must acknowledge 
clientel relationships and the diversity of economic systems 
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but can seek to diminish the effects of these differences by 
defining an area of common ground where conununication, 
cooperation, and eventual integration can be pursued in a 
productive, developmental, and relatively non-controversial 
way. 
Though it may be argued that the presence of Israel 
as a perceived common threat to the Arab states is an inte¬ 
grating factor within the region, this simplistic presumption 
ignores the underlying web of external loyalties and inter- 
dependencies. Furthermore, the type of integration promoted 
by military threat is at best an unstable alliance that 
promotes military investment and cooperation but fails to 
address the common needs of the Arab people such as the 
needs for development and stability. Clearly, Arabs cannot 
indefinitely depend upon Israel as a primary source of 
cohesion. In the final analysis, Arab unity must reflect 
positive values if it is to survive the vagaries of regional 
conflict. Bernard Lewis wrote in Foreign Affairs in 1968, 
It would not be easy for the great powers to lose 
interest and might well be painful for the Middle East, 
where the final fulfillment of the long-standing demand 
for the end of imperialism could have disconcerting 
political and economic effects. Without foreign stimu¬ 
lation, there would be grave danger of deterioration and 
regression; without foreign irritants, there might be 
some hope of peace.14 
A decade has made Lewis 1 concern about the effects 
of a loss of "foreign stimulation" dated. The economic 
potential of the Middle East as well as its interdependence 
is assured. Lewis' observation that "the hope for peace" is 
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related to the removal of "foreign irritants" is more timely. 
Though it is impossible to extract the Middle East from the 
global web of interdependence, the prospect of the removal 
of "foreign irritants" is both desirable and tangible. The 
dynamics of such a removal involve the mutual consent of the 
United States and the Soviet Union to allow the Arab region 
to evolve as such, and the ability of the Arabs themselves 
to overcome the obstacles to cooperation. The emergence of 
an autonomous region without a military portfolio is con¬ 
ceivable if those intrusion powers in the global system 
would agree to mutual restraint. The strengthening of the 
autonomy of the Arab region must depend upon an intricate 
balance of global and region forces. A de-militarized, 
developing Arab region, defused as a possible source of 
super-power conflict, may be the best of all possible worlds 
for all parties concerned. 
The second level of political conflict in the Arab 
region is among the Arab nations themselves. First, there 
are traditional and historical conflicts. Michael Van Dusen 
states, 
One of the greatest obstacles to political integration 
in developing societies is regionalism or localism. 
Within the Arab Middle East local loyalties continue to 
a large extent to define the nature of political com¬ 
mitments . 
It must be remembered that most Arab nations are 
emerging from colonialism. Colonial powers depended upon 
the inability of their subjects to unite in opposition to 
their colonial masters. The British, Turks, and French had 
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a vested interest in internal divisions of the Arab peoples. 
It is not surprising that these internal divisions have sur¬ 
faced as violence in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. 
Conflict internal to or regardless of national borders is one 
type of historical or traditional conflict. 
Historically, Arab nations have known conflict. 
Though national conflicts were muted by the Ottoman Turks 
and the European colonialists, the historical cultural 
centers of Cairo, Damascus, and Bagdad also spawned their 
respective political champions. The potential for competi¬ 
tion for a dominant role in any scheme of Arab cooperation 
is evident from the behavior of the Arab states in the forma¬ 
tion and dissolution of the United Arab Republic. 
No plan for any type of regional integration can 
ignore the traditional conflicts within the region. Competi¬ 
tion for regional supremacy is almost a foregone conclusion. 
Competition within a region can, however, be positive, if 
the objective of competition is the greatest contribution to 
regional development projects or ventures within the frame¬ 
work of regional complementarity, or agricultural yield 
increases, or any of the many possible ways than mankind can 
cooperatively better its lot. 
A second type of regional conflict exists because 
different types of power centers can be identified within 
the Arab region. 
With its vast oil reserves and traditional religious 
significance, Saudi Arabia is unquestionably a center of the 
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Arab world. As a possible distribution point of development 
funding, Saudi Arabia draws the hopeful and ambitious as 
surely as Mecca draws its pilgrims. 
Egypt, with its mass of humanity and proud history, 
is a political center of the Arab region. On the basis of 
its population alone, Egypt would be a center of demographic 
power; but in the case of Egypt, it is the intangible power 
of the legacy of Nasser that also figures in its centrality 
to the issue of Arab nationalism. 
A nation without a state, the Palestinian nation is 
the third center. Palestine is a common cause of the Arabs. 
The issue of Palestine transcends the land in contention, and 
to some degree ignores the well-being of the Palestinians 
and instead focuses on the pride of the Arab people. 
Palestine, as an Arab issue, gained currency as Pan-Arab 
nationalism encountered the realities of power politics. 
The association of Palestinian intellectuals with Arab or 
revolutionary socialism is strong. Palestine seems to 
coalesce the frustrations of the Arab people and thus serves 
as a center of social consciousness in the Arab region. 
The existence of physically and functionally diver¬ 
gent centers within the Arab region can contribute to con¬ 
flict, or if properly balanced could serve as a mechanism for 
the distribution of power on an equitable basis throughout 
the region. A regional system of checks and balances is not 
such a far flung concept, but it is one that is entirely de¬ 
pendent upon the rejection of violence as a means of settling 
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regional conflict. With the development of infrastructure 
projects would come the beginning of a regional administra¬ 
tion that could eventually temper the sources of conflict 
that otherwise might instigate violence or deposit conflict 
in the mercuric chambers of international diplomacy. 
The third type of regional conflict has already been 
touched upon in the earlier discussion of the distribution 
of oil reserves and labor within the region. As long as 
petrodollars can attract labor, the movement of labor from 
oil-poor, labor-rich to oil-rich, labor-poor nations will 
continue. With the movement of labor will be an increasing 
potential for social upheaval in both labor contributing and 
labor receiving nations. Ian Smart remarks on the future 
dmoestic condition of the Arab states. 
I do not mean to paint too black a picture. I see 
no reason why the pressure of domestic ferment should 
not be contained--and, in the longer term, dissipated-- 
in most of the countries concerned. Meanwhile, I expect 
some reduction in the level of international conflict in 
the region. The fact remains that I foresee a decade of 
rising domestic turbulence within many of these countries, 
just as I expect an increasing conservatism in the for¬ 
mal domestic and external policies of their governments.16 
Unfortunately Mr. Smart does not provide the basis 
of his optimism. If Smart's prediction of "rising domestic 
turbulence" is correct, then definite measures must be under¬ 
taken which will accommodate both the need for the easy 
movement of labor within the Arab region and the turbulence 
inherent in such movement. If labor movement is tied to 
project development and the fruits of labor are clearly 
evident in the form of regional development projects, then 
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labor movement could be monitored and controlled, while 
labor and labor pools would avoid the malaise of alienation. 
If the third level of conflict, internal sociological 
imbalances, are allowed to exacerbate, the ensuing instabi¬ 
lity could be easily exploited by the Soviet Union, or in 
defense against such exploitation lead to intolerable 
authoritarian regimes. Labor movement and manpower develop¬ 
ment must be regionally coordinated. The creation of a two- 
tiered society, made up of the petroleum rich and a poor 
working class, is not compatible with the process of long 
range development. Regional answers must address regional 
problems. 
Prescriptions: A Prologue 
The politics and economics of the Middle East 
coupled with the cultural homogeneity of the Arab Region 
serve as a perfect setting for the merger of integration and 
development projects. The Arab region contains great natural, 
financial and human resources. The region itself is ripe 
for development as teeming masses cry for a better life and 
unexploited natural resources encourage the development of 
infrastructure, transportation and industrial capacity. The 
likelihood of a comprehensive scheme for integration in the 
Arab region is significantly diminished by the presence of 
tangible political and economic obstacles. Disparities 
between Arab nations in development, population, ideology, 
alignment, wealth, and traditional affinities obstruct Pan- 
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Arabism, but, paradoxically, at the same time, make a Pan- 
Arabist approach to integration and development necessary. 
Only by avoiding confrontation with the overpowering 
obstacles to integration can integration gain sufficient 
impetus to eventually challenge the disparity and illogic of 
a divided Arab World. By defining objectives of mutual 
desirability, the cohesion of the Arab states can be 
strengthened to the point where the "classical" model of 
integration "takes-off" or begins to operate. At this point 
in history, it is unlikely that any comprehensive plan or 
model for integration in the Arab region would be anything 
more than wishful thinking. In a region, or moreso, a world 
where technical expertise is at the premium, the engineers 
of human cooperation and development can best be utilized in 
the attainment of objectives that have a relatively high 
probability of attainment. Such attainable objectives can 
be determined by a logical set of criterion. Dennis 
Rondinelli observes, "Nearly all theorists advocate that 
development projects be initiated through identification and 
analysis of problems susceptible to solution by project 
1 7 investment." 
Dr. Rondinelli establishes a cycle for a well planned 
project. Rondinelli's cycle will be a useful template for 
the projects which will later be prescribed. 
Cycle for a well-planned project 
1. identification and definition 
2. formulation, preparation, and design 
3. appraisal 
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4. selection, negotiation, and approval 
5. activation and organization 
6. implementation and operation 
7. supervision, coordination, and control 
8. termination or completion 
9. dissemination of output and transition to normal 
administration 
10. post evaluation and follow up 
Rondinelli's cycle is particularly appropriate to a 
developing context because it stresses planning, transition, 
and follow up. Planning of projects is necessary to the 
requirement of best utilization of limited resources. 
Transition from the project mode to the administrative mode 
is necessary to the stability and continuation of the effort 
underway. Evaluation and follow-up are in recognition of 
the experimental stage of project development; and the need 
to identify modalities which work in the context to which 
they are applied. Rondinelli has noted, "Analysis of project 
planning and implementation in developing nations leaves 
little doubt that extensive improvements are needed in over¬ 
all management capacity."-^ 
Projects alone are not the solution to development 
and integration in the Middle East. As Rondinelli has noted, 
there is in absence of managerial capacity in the region. 
This shortage can be and is being addressed by extensive 
education projects, but these projects could be augmented by 
specific policies which coordinated and assigned available 
managerial manpower and expertise in a rational way. Beyond 
the question of the allocation of manpower lie other 
structural impediments to integration and development. 
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Tariffs, currency, finance, and the competition for the bene¬ 
fits of proposed projects must all be dealt with if projects 
of a regional scope can be undertaken. Though a comprehen¬ 
sive scheme for integration and development cannot precede 
the development needs and consequent solutions to those needs, 
the identification, selection, and implementation of projects 
will create a need for a type of integrating mechanism that 
would be self-perpetuating. In other words, as projects 
confronted the obstacles to their implementation, the per¬ 
ceived need for those projects would stimulate the solutions 
necessary to overcome the obstacles. The solutions necessary 
to overcome the obstacles would be the building blocks for a 
comprehensive scheme of integration. Integration would be 
pursued inductively, in the field, instead of deductively, 
in the conference room. However, before projects can even 
be identified, a certain level of cooperation must exist; 
therefore, the prescriptions which follow must not only 
identify projects but must identify those areas necessary to 
inception of the cycle for a well-planned project. Thus, the 
following prescriptions will concern the financial and 
political infrastructure of the region as well as the 
particular projects best suited to meet the development 
needs of the people. These general prescriptions will be 
followed by a discussion of several specific potential and 
ongoing projects in the region. 
CHAPTER V 
PRESCRIPTIONS 
A theoretical basis for prescription has been 
established. An exploration of the values and context of 
the Arab peoples has begun. Integration theory has been 
modified in light of the development needs of the Arab 
region. The politics and economics of the Middle East have 
been correlated with the prospects of regional integration. 
It is now possible to conclude this study with several 
modest prescriptions which can be derived from the antecedent 
theory and analysis. Prescriptions will be ventured that 
address both general conditions and specific projects. It 
is hoped that this study, if not making new prescriptions, 
has to some degree provided a foundation for the prescrip¬ 
tions selected by the tedious process undertaken by this 
author. 
General Prescriptions 
With the tremendous impact of petrodollars on the 
Arab region diluted by the absence of a coordinated effort 
to distribute funds so as to maximize regional development, 
a prescription which proposes a centralized financial 
authority is necessary. Given the need of petrodollar 
investors to see a fair return on investment, a centralized 
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financial authority could take the form of a central lending 
agency for the Arab region. National lending agencies have 
developed in Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. On 
a regional basis, in 1968, the Arab Fund for Economic and 
Social Development was formed. The formation of the Inter- 
Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation brought into being an 
entity which insures investment funds against the vagaries 
of nationalization, revolution, and war. Though the 
existence of these funds and the Inter-Arab Investment 
Guarantee Corporation is a positive indication of interest 
in and commitment to regional development, Mallakh and 
Kadhim have observed. 
The proliferation of development lending agencies 
appears to: 
1. encourage the diffusion of scarce manpower, 
planners, economists, administrators, engineers, and 
technicians--into small units which are less capable and 
efficient in the evaluation of submitted projects without 
delay and in a reasonably professional manner; 
2. prevent the application of uniform criteria for 
project appraisal both among and within sectors and 
countries. The establishment of such criteria would 
greatly enhance the prospects of regional development 
and economic integration as the flow of aid would be 
channeled to countries and sectors with the explicit 
goal of securing such an outcome; 
3. militate against the formulation of integrated 
programs of aid to individual recipient countries; 
4. increase the costs of aid administration and 
surveillance. These costs may be substantially reduced 
and the effectiveness of aid supervision considerably 
strengthened if the lending agency is large enough to 
permit the establishment of country or regional and sub- 
regional representative offices in the recipient 
countries; 
5. reduce the capability of individual lending 
agencies to carry out substantive and comprehensive 
research concerning the economies of recipient countries, 
the promising avenues of investment, and possibly the 
preparation of a list of bankable projects; 
6. increase the donor's non-development consideration 
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since a national lending institution is more likely to 
be subject to narrow political pressures than a multi¬ 
national agency. Moreover, multinational aid agencies, 
which include the recipient countries, even if on a 
modest scale, increase the sense of involvement and 
participation of the latter in the aid program to the 
benefit of all concerned. 
It is, therefore, in the interest of the donor and 
recipient alike that the proliferation of Arab non- 
specialized development lending institutions be 
restrained and a move toward consolidation or at least 
coordination of their various lending agencies be 
initiated.1 
Demir looks at the proliferation of lending institu¬ 
tions in a more positive light. "This plethora of institu¬ 
tions geared toward Arab regional development provides a 
unique chance for economic development and possibly economic 
integration within the region."2 
Although Demir applauds the existence of the insti¬ 
tutions, he, like Mallahk and Kadhim, proposes the coordina¬ 
tion of their activities. It is no small surprise that 
Demir, an employee of UNITAR, proposes a large role for the 
United Nations in the coordination of these agencies. 
Specifically, Demir mentions the Economic Commission for 
Western Asia and the United Nations Development Programme as 
major role players. The use of other UN specialized agencies 
(FAO, UNIDO, WHO, UNCTAD, etc.) to assist in actual project 
O 
selection and implementation is also suggested by Demir.-" 
A centralized lending authority need not preempt 
existing agencies; rather, it could form a hub from which 
the other agencies would share information and combine 
efforts. The availability of UN specialized agencies to 
augment the selection and implementation phases of project 
91 
development could add needed expertise. 
A second general prescription is drawn from the 
functionalist's concern over the potential of regionalism to 
create super-states. To avert alienation from the periphery, 
Arab development projects should, when possible, go beyond 
the borders of the region into black Africa, and the northern 
tier countries of Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran. To promote 
South-South solidarity, Arab development funds and lending 
agencies should continue to support projects completely 
external to the region, but of real need to other develop¬ 
ing areas. To guarantee the viability of the OECD economies 
from which valuable technology is imported, internal 
development should be tempered by a commitment to recycle 
petrodollars. 
The final general prescription is for a central 
clearing house for currency and the establishment of a time¬ 
table for conversion to a common currency of foreign 
exchange. This prescription applies to the technical 
requirements of funding multinational projects. 
The first specific prescription is that the proposed 
funding for the Sudanese Agricultural Project be invested as 
planned. Ahmed Abou-Bakr writes, 
. . . the Arab Authority for Agricultural investment, an 
investment group made up of petroleum-producing Arab 
nations, in 1975 concluded a 5.7 billion dollar agree¬ 
ment with the government of Sudan to develop all sectors 
of the economy in the next ten years.4 
Three billion dollars is earmarked for agricultural 
development alone.^ The Sudan hopes to be self-sufficient 
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by 1985 in all basic food products and export 20 per cent of 
the entire Arab region's meat and sugar and 40 per cent of 
the regions vegetable oil.^ However, Dr. Anis Barghouti, 
the economic attache to the Arab League Mission to the 
United Nations, remarked in March 1978 that little had been 
done to fulfill the promise of the Sudan. Agricultural 
development should be a priority for Pan-Arabist decision- 
makers . 
Another area of prescription involves the develop¬ 
ment of regional pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. At 
present the need for prescription and non-prescription drugs 
in the Arab region is met almost entirely by export.^ The 
Arab Economic Unity Council is experimenting with the 
creation of jointly financed region corporations whose 
products would be free from tariff. The pharmaceutical 
manufacturing project would address a cormnon need in both an 
economical and profitable manner. 
The final specific prescription is for the creation 
of a development project identification team made up of 
international civil servants, technical experts, financial 
experts, and liasons to the funding agencies and finance 
ministries. This team would strive for political detachment 
in its assessment of the development needs in the Arab 
region. The team itself would not be affiliated with a 
particular agency but might offer its recommendations to a 
central agency if one were formed. 
These general and specific prescriptions are not 
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exhaustive by any means. They are compatible with the 
philosophy expressed in the theory for Regional Integrative 
Development. The prescriptions are not overwhelming or 
Particularly far-reaching. They are attainable within the 
present context of the Middle East. 
CONCLUSION 
A basis for prescriptive theory has been developed. 
A theory of Regional Integrative Development has been 
collated from theories of integration. The Arab context has 
been sketched and some prescriptions have been written. But 
in conclusion, this author feels that the true dynamics of 
the Middle East remain hidden. Animosities run deep and 
unpredictability is the only thing that seems to be pre¬ 
dictable. The shock of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the 
invasion of southern Lebanon, and the intransigence of 
Menachem Begin bely a deeper reality at work. The innocence 
of David Mitrany is in stark contrast to the harsh realities 
of refugee camps, terrorism, the occupation of land won in 
war, and a political tension that erupts at the slightest 
provocation. The shock waves of four wars are still felt 
and yet the peacemakers are seemingly ignored. The imposi¬ 
tion of a settlement in the Middle East is appealing in its 
simplicity but seems impossible to implement. 
The Middle East is armed to an unprecedented degree. 
War in the Middle East is a real threat. Steps must be 
taken to alleviate the tensions which beset the region. 
The impediments to a just and lasting peace are 
three-fold. 
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1. the absence of a guarantee of survival for 
Israel 
2. the absence of a Palestinian homeland 
3. the continued occupation of Arab territories 
The prescriptions of Chapter V do not directly 
address these impediments. Hopefully, peace can be con¬ 
structed out of a program of development. A concerted 
effort toward Regional Integrative Development would occupy 
minds otherwise spent in hatred or despair. But function- 
alism and its step-son, Regional Integrative Development, 
are particularly helpless during the lag time between 
conceptualization and the harvest of the fruits of integra¬ 
tion. Restraint must be practiced and a program of regional 
development should begin. 
The incentives for peace become tangible when men 
perceive themselves to be bettering their lives. 
That the solidarity of the Arab people is a perceived 
threat to the security of Israel is an ironic twist, for it 
is only through solidarity that an equitable distribution 
of manpower and resources can be attained. 
Without a regional program of cooperation the 
inequity of Arab life will destabilize governments and 
encourage demogoguery. The distribution of wealth in the 
Arab region is uneven. Petrodollars should to an increasing 
per cent be routed through the Arab region. 
The prospects for peace are almost entirely dependent 
on the affirmative actions of those who seek to build peace 
from the shared needs of a beleaguered humanity. The 
prescriptions offered in this study are at worst benign. 
The organization of Pan-Arabist sentiment into functional 
units and applied to specific projects could be an 
important first step toward eventual peace and prosperity 
in the Middle East. 
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